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Compensation is the principal means by which companies in the
United States seek to motivate managers to act in the best interests
of shareholders. The emphasis on stock options as a component
of executive pay in the United States also, however, encourages
opportunistic behavior by managers. Exercise prices of executive
stock options are typically established as the company's stock
price on the date the options are granted. Managers can therefore
enhance the value of their option awards by timing grant dates to
precede the release of favorable corporate news. In fact, evidence
suggests that they do so. There has been considerable uncertainty
over whether such behavior constitutes insider trading. This
Article attributes such uncertainty to gaps in current law. In
particular, insider trading doctrine easily handles open-market
transactions, but it does a poor job of addressing situations in
which managers deal with their own corporations, such as in the
case of executive stock option grants. In these circumstances,
numerous questions arise, including whether the corporation or its
shareholders have been deceived. Drawing on current doctrine
and the purposes of the insider trading laws, this Article suggests
that both executives and boards of directors have at least some
disclosure obligations to shareholders regarding the compensatory
element of favorably timed grants. Moreover, it may well be that
such grants are subject to the same "disclose or abstain" rule
applicable in the traditional insider trading context.
INTR O D U CTIO N ....................................................................................... 836
I. STOCK OPTIONS AND THE OPTION AWARD PROCESS ........... 839
A. The Role of Stock Options in Compensating Executives .. 839
B. The Stock Option Award Process ........................................ 841
*Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. B.A., Pomona College; B.A., M.A.,
Exeter College, Oxford University; J.D., Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Alison
Anderson, Steve Bainbridge, Dan Bussel, Laura Gomez, Bill Klein, Lynn Stout, Bill
Wang, and David Yermack for input, and to Cheryl Kelly, Kevin McReynolds, Shane
Nowaratzky, Paul Rose, Stephanie Thomas-Hodge, Christine Wichrowki, and the
librarians and staff of the Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library, particularly Linda Karr
O'Connor, for research assistance in connection with this Article. This Article reflects the
author's views and does not necessarily reflect those of the foregoing individuals.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
II. OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING OF STOCK OPTION AWARDS .......... 852
A . E viden ce ................................................................................. 852
B. Direct Costs to Shareholders of Favorably Timed
G ran ts ..................................................................................... 857
III. SITUATING STOCK OPTION AWARDS WITHIN THE LAW
OF INSIDER TRADING .................................................................. 859
A. The Fiduciary Duty and Deception Requirements of
R ule 10b-5 .............................................................................. 859
1. State Law Fiduciary Duties ............................................ 864
2. A Uniform Federal Fiduciary Duty ............................... 872
B . P urchase or Sale .................................................................... 881
C. In Connection with ................................................................ 886
C O N CLU SIO N ........................................................................................... 888
INTRODUCTION
Equity-based compensation, in particular stock option awards,
have conventionally been viewed as an effective way of linking
managerial pay to company performance.1 Based on the widespread
belief that they operate to align managers' interests with those of
shareholders, stock options became the centerpiece of the vast
majority of executive compensation packages beginning in the early
1990s.2 Such reliance on stock options to pay executives was the
primary factor underlying dramatic increases in executive
compensation during this period.3
The importance of stock options as a component of executive
compensation makes it attractive for managers to maximize their
firms' stock prices because the value of stock options increases as
stock prices increase.4  Stock prices are, however, only one
1. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323 (1976)
(discussing the use of incentive compensation systems to align managerial interests with
those of outside equity holders).
2. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 653 (1998) (finding that the level of CEO compensation
and such compensation's sensitivity to firm performance has risen dramatically, largely
because of increases in stock option grants); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive
Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 847, 847 (2002) (reporting that during the 1990s median total compensation of
CEOs nearly tripled from $2.3 million to over $6.5 million and that the increase in CEO
pay over this period primarily reflected growth in stock options, which rose from twenty-
seven percent to fifty-one percent of total compensation).
3. See Hall & Liebman, supra note 2, at 653; Murphy, supra note 2, at 847.
4. Nevertheless, compensation programs that depend heavily on stock price behavior
may not be in the best interests of shareholders. See STUART L. GILLAN & JOHN D.
[Vol. 82
2004] SECRET COMPENSATION
determinant of stock option value. The exercise price of an option;
that is, the price at which the option holder is entitled to purchase the
underlying stock during the option's life, is another key element of
stock option value. Specifically, a lower exercise price increases the
value of an executive's stock options.'
Several finance scholars have noted unusual stock price behavior
shortly following stock option awards, which are the dates on which
exercise prices are typically set.6 In particular, top managers receive
stock option awards not long before statistically significant increases
in stock prices occur. Such post-grant stock price increases enhance
the value of the managers' options.
The foregoing evidence suggests that the timing of stock option
grants may be designed to precede favorable firm-specific news
announcements. There are numerous accounts of opportunistic
behavior by corporate managers. However, none focus on whether
compensating managers through the beneficial timing of option
grants is an appropriate use of inside information under the federal
law of insider trading. Moreover, the possibility that granting
MARTIN, CENTER FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE, COLLEGE OF Bus. & ECON., UNIV. OF
DEL., FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE COLLAPSE OF
ENRON 31 (2002) (questioning whether such programs align managerial and shareholder
interests or lead to a myopic focus on short-term stock prices), available at
http://www.be.udel.edu/ccg/research-files/CCGWP2002-1.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An
Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
613, 681 (1988) (discussing management's incentive to focus on the stock price of a
corporation, as opposed to the corporation itself, when management's pay depends on
stock price).
5. For a discussion of the determinants of stock option value, see RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 494-98 (7th ed.
2003).
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See, e.g., MATTHIAS BENZ ET AL., UNIV. OF ZURICH INST. FOR EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH IN ECON., ARE STOCK OPTIONS THE MANAGERS' BLESSING? STOCK
OPTION COMPENSATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 18-19 (2001) (finding that in
Standard & Poors 500 firms, a higher concentration of shareholders results in fewer
options granted to top executives), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp061.pdf
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL
MULLAINATHAN, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, Do CEOS SET THEIR OWN
PAY? THE ONES WITHOUT PRINCIPALS DO (2000) 37 (finding that CEOs at firms
without large shareholders do not give up as much cash compensation as those at firms
with large shareholders when their option-based compensation increases), available at
http://papers.nber.org/ papers/w7604.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
See generally David Yermack, Good Timing. CEO Stock Option Awards and Company
News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997) (offering evidence supporting the proposition
that managers manipulate stock option grant dates around favorable corporate news
announcements).
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favorably timed stock options constitutes insider trading has hovered
below the radar screens of both regulatory authorities and the
practicing bar.8  In addressing the subject, this Article discusses
important implications for both insider trading theory and
compensation policy.
Part I of this Article looks at the role of stock options in
executive compensation programs and explores managerial influence
over the executive compensation process. Part II reviews the
empirical data relating to the opportunistic timing of executive stock
option grants. Looking solely at non-periodic grants, which are
assumed to be timed with discretion,9 supports the view that grant
dates are systematically set to benefit executives. Such good timing
allows managers to reap profits that are difficult for shareholders to
detect; that is, to earn "secret compensation." The result is that
careful timing of option grants potentially allows corporate executives
to extract substantial amounts of compensation from firms that may
well increase their total compensation beyond what shareholders
would approve.
Part III examines whether the practice of timing option awards
to precede the announcement of good news can be treated as a form
of insider trading. It then addresses the more difficult question
whether board knowledge of the information matters to this
determination. The analysis then turns to whether a board of
directors possessing inside information when making a favorably
timed option award violates Rule lOb-5.
Part III also analyzes two additional requirements of Rule 10b-5
that are controversial in the option grant setting. It asks whether an
option grant is a "purchase or sale" of a security and whether the
fraud associated with an insider's failure to disclose inside
information when dealing in an option grant is "in connection with"
such a purchase or sale, concluding that an option grant satisfies both
requirements. The Article concludes with a brief summary and
suggestions for possible implementation of Rule 10b-5 against insider
option grants.
8. Commenting on favorably timed option grants made by Fore Systems, Inc., see
infra note 185, Peter Romeo, former chief counsel of the SEC, was quoted as stating that
he did not believe the insider trading rules would apply to the grants because actual share
trading was not involved. Timothy D. Schellhardt, Options Granted During Takeover
Talks Are Boon for Executives at Fore Systems, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1999, at C1. The
same article quoted an SEC spokesman as believing that the SEC had never brought an
action against a company that granted stock option awards while private takeover talks
were underway. Id.
9. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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I. STOCK OPTIONS AND THE OPTION AWARD PROCESS
A. The Role of Stock Options in Compensating Executives
It is well understood that managers have their own objectives in
executing their functions, which do not necessarily coincide with the
objectives of a corporation or its shareholders." There are numerous
reasons why mechanisms might be needed to better align managers'
interests with those of shareholders. Managers may neglect their
duties unless they are held responsible for their companies'
performance. Even those managers that are dedicated to their jobs
may make decisions that fail to maximize shareholder wealth. For
example, without incentives to do otherwise, managers might grant
exorbitant pay increases or increases in benefits to subordinates,
spend lavishly on their work environments or business travel, or use
firm resources to select projects that enhance their status in their
communities or in which they have a personal interest."1
If shareholders could observe executives' actions perfectly and
without cost, they could specify every one of the executives' decisions
to maximize shareholder value. 2 The presence of agency costs-the
costs incurred to prevent shirking by agents-keeps shareholders
from doing so. 3 Instead, the agency cost model predicts that they will
make executive pay depend on the firm's financial performance. 4
There are various devices through which shareholders can do so
including performance-based bonuses, restricted stock, and stock
options. 5 In the United States, however, stock options are the
incentive device of choice. 6
10. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932).
11. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 214 (1992).
12. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 89
(1979).
13. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 308.
14. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 782 (1972) (noting that, for example,
offering the executive any "residual product above prescribed amounts" will give the
executive an incentive not to shirk his duties).
15. For a review of executive compensation possibilities, see BRUCE R. ELLIG, THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 301-460 (2002).
16. See Joseph A. McCahery & Luc Renneboog, Managerial Remuneration: The
Indirect Pay-For-Performance Relation, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 317, 322 (2001) (stating that
top managers in the United States receive a higher proportion of their total income in
stock options than in any other form). Recently, Microsoft abandoned options in favor of
restricted stock in part to respond to mounting criticism of options. Robert A. Guth &
JoAnn S. Lublin, Microsoft Ushers Out Era of Options, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2003, at Al.
2004]
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A stock option is the right to purchase (through the "exercise" of
the option) a stipulated number of shares of the stock of a company
(the issuer) at a stated cost (the exercise or strike price) over a
prescribed period of time (the exercise period) in accordance with
stated eligibility requirements (vesting requirements). 7 For example,
suppose an executive is granted options to purchase 400,000 shares at
an exercise price of $50 per share that vest in equal installments over
four years and that are exercisable for a term of ten years measured
from the date of the grant. Then each year, the executive will acquire
the right to purchase 100,000 shares at $50 per share at any time
before the options expire ten years from the grant date. If, after one
year, the executive exercises 100,000 options and sells the stock when
the stock is trading at $55 per share, his pre-tax profit is $500,000.
An attractive feature of options from the perspective of
shareholders is that their value, like shareholder wealth, is at risk with
the price of the company's stock. Stock options have, however, been
increasingly criticized in recent years. 8 One difficulty with options,
for example, is that they do not necessarily provide managers with
incentives for pursuing the long-term interests of shareholders or the
firm. 9 In other words, conflicts of interest are intrinsic to option-
based compensation.
Recent accounting and corporate scandals, involving companies
such as Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco, have focused attention on the
potential for executive manipulation of short-term stock prices in
order to enhance stock option values.20 Other methods available to
managers for increasing the value of stock options have received far
less attention. In particular, when conditions permit managers to
exert sufficient influence over the option award process, managers are
motivated to enhance the value of their options by encouraging
awards to be made before upcoming favorable company news
announcements. Because an option's exercise price is typically set at
the time of the grant, stock price increases resulting from the
subsequent release of such news raise the option's value. Yet, such
This move has not yet been widely followed. See id. Moreover, the favorable timing of
restricted stock grants raises the same insider trading concerns discussed with respect to
options in this Article.
17. ELLIG, supra note 15, at 357.
18. See Jennifer Hill & Charles M. Yablon, Corporate Governance and Executive
Remuneration: Rediscovering Managerial Positional Conflict, 25 U. N.S.W. L.J. 294, 302
(2002).
19. See supra note 4.
20. See generally GILLAN & MARTIN, supra note 4 (outlining Enron's accounting and
reporting procedures).
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value is attributable under these circumstances not to the efforts of
managers but, rather, to good timing. 1 Parts I.B and II below
contend that managers can and do influence the timing of stock
option awards to their personal advantage, and that this behavior is
costly to shareholders.
B. The Stock Option Award Process
Shareholders, institutional activists and government regulators
have increasingly focused their agendas on executive pay.22 Because
the process of setting executive compensation is often complex and
partially informal in nature, however, executives at large public
companies retain numerous opportunities for influencing the terms of
their own remuneration. The discussion below describes the various
ways in which managers can exert power over the terms of their
compensation packages in general and their stock option awards in
particular.
Nominally, the board of directors of a corporation has ultimate
responsibility for determining the compensation of its key
executives.23 A majority of the board may, however, broadly delegate
its authority to one or more committees.24  Except as to certain
matters enumerated by statute, such committees may exercise all the
powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of
the business and affairs of the corporation to the extent conferred
21. See generally Yermack, supra note 7 (investigating the hypothesis that "managers
influence the terms of their own compensation").
22. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and
Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 284-87
(2000). Under immense public pressure stemming from various accounting and corporate
scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002-which President George W.
Bush signed into law on July 30, 2002-containing civil, criminal, and administrative
reforms designed to alter accounting, corporate governance, and securities industry
practices. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation."). References to state corporate law are to the Delaware
General Corporation Law on the ground that more than fifty percent of all public
companies in the United States are incorporated in Delaware. See Lucian Arye Bebchuck
& Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 57 BUS. LAW. 1047, 1054
tbl.2 (2002); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1795, 1804 (2002).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (providing that the majority of a board
may designate committees).
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upon them by the board or in the corporation's bylaws.
Public companies commonly establish a compensation committee
and delegate to it the responsibility for overseeing the compensation
of executive officers.26 Although the precise responsibilities of any
given compensation committee depend on the board's specific
delegation of authority, typical responsibilities of a compensation
committee involve: (1) recommending compensation programs and
pay levels for the CEO and other top executives; (2) approving
employment agreements and other contracts with such executives;
and (3) administering equity-based and other long-term incentive
compensation plans, including making individual equity grants. 7
When a compensation committee recommends option-based
compensation for company executives, the company's board of
directors will typically adopt a stock option plan setting forth the
basic terms of the awards. Virtually all stock option plans are then
submitted to the corporation's stockholders for approval. 28  The
responsibility for making specific awards pursuant to the plan is
typically then delegated to the compensation committee. 9
For purposes of this Article, it is relevant to distinguish between
option awards that are made at about the same time each year, or
"periodic" awards, and option awards that are made at unpredictable
25. Id. (stating that committees created by the board may exercise the full power and
authority conferred upon them).
26. The establishment of a committee of the board of directors responsible for the
design and level of executive pay has become commonplace as a result of both the
complexity of executive compensation issues and regulatory requirements. See ELLIG,
supra note 15, at 510-12.
27. For example, under its current charter, the Compensation Committee of Qwest
Communications International Inc.: (1) determines the salaries, cash bonuses and fringe
benefits of Qwest's executive officers; (2) reviews Qwest's salary administration and
benefit policies; and (3) administers Qwest's equity incentive plans. QWEST
COMMUNICATIONS INT'L INC., PROXY STATEMENT 6 (2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
28. The reasons that stock option plans are submitted to stockholders include
requirements for such approval: (1) in the listing standards of the New York Stock
Exchange and the Nasdaq Market, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.08 (2003) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL], available at http://www.nyse.com
/listed/p1020656067970.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); NAT'L ASSOC.
OF SEC. DEALERS, ("NASD") MANUAL § 4350(i) (2003), available at
http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/nasd-manual.pdf, at 683-85 (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); (2) in certain state corporate laws, see N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 505(d) (McKinney 2003); and (3) to qualify for the deductibility of performance-based
compensation over $1 million under I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000), see DANIEL NIEHANS &
SHAWN E. LAMPRON, 2 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION FOR EMERGING COMPANIES 7-5 to
7-6 (2d ed. 2002).
29. See ELLIG, supra note 15, at 510-12.
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times, or "non-periodic" awards. Based on surveys of option grant
dates, about forty percent of awards are non-periodic. 3° A periodic
award is generally not deemed to present an opportunity for
manipulating the timing of the award.3' A non-periodic award,
however, can be made at any time the compensation committee
selects. Consequently, the timing of these awards is subject to
discretion.
The timing of an award is significant because most options are
granted as of the date the award decision is made with an exercise
price that is equal to the market price of the company's stock on that
date (that is, "at the money").3" One important reason for granting
at-the-money options is their advantageous accounting treatment. In
1972, the Accounting Principles Board, the predecessor of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board,33 issued Opinion No. 25,
Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees ("APB 25"), a landmark
ruling on executive pay.' Under APB 25, a company that issues
executive stock options where the number and exercise price per
share of stock underlying the options are known on the grant date
(subject only to the contingency that the options vest over time)
recognizes a compensation expense on its income statement equal to
the difference, if any, between the market price of the stock on the
date of the grant and the option's exercise price. The net result is
that there is no requirement for a charge to company earnings for "at-
the-money" options.36 "Discount options" (options with an exercise
30. See David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of
Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCr. & ECON. 73, 80-81 (2000); Keith W.
Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock Option
Grants, 103 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 22 (2000); Yermack, supra note 7, at 459.
31. See SEC Rule 10b-5(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1)(c)(1) (2002) (providing an
affirmative defense from liability for the purchase or sale of a security by an individual
who was aware of material nonpublic information where the transaction occurred
pursuant to a binding contract, trading instruction, or written plan that came into existence
before the person became aware of material nonpublic information).
32. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 2485, 2508 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (stating that ninety-
five percent of options have exercise prices at grant-date fair market value).
33. The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") is an independent
accounting authority financed by the accounting industry. Although the SEC has formal
supervisory authority over auditing standards and procedures, it has generally acquiesced
to the rules and standards adopted by the FASB. Manuel A. Rodriguez, The Numbers
Game: Manipulation of Financial Reporting by Corporations and Their Executives, 10 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 451,454-55 (2002).
34. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, APB OPINION No. 25,
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES (2001) [hereinafter APB 25].
35. Id. at 285.
36. In 1995, the FASB issued a statement under which companies could either
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price below the market price of the stock on the grant date) do,
however, trigger an expense equal to the amount of the discount.
In addition, options that qualify as incentive stock options
generally provide grantees with favorable tax treatment relative to
options that fail to so qualify.37 One requirement necessary for an
option to qualify as an incentive stock option is that its exercise price
be at least equal to the fair market value of the stock on the grant
date.38 Moreover, in the case of public companies, options must be
granted at or above the fair market value of the stock in order to be
considered "performance-based compensation" under section 162(m)
of the Internal Revenue Code.3 9 Such options are tax deductible
compensation to the employer even if an executive's total
nonperformance-based compensation exceeds $1 million per year.40
Given that compensation committees select the timing of non-
periodic option awards, and that the exercise prices of such awards
are generally the price at which the stock is trading on the award date,
managers have an interest in influencing compensation committees to
award non-periodic grants shortly before favorable firm-specific news
announcements in the hope that the news release will raise the
company's stock price. Revisiting the example given in Part I.A,
suppose that a CEO is granted options to purchase 400,000 shares at
continue accounting for stock options under APB 25 or determine the cost of those
options on the grant date using a "fair value based" formula, taking into account the stock
price at the grant date, the exercise price, the expected life of the option, the volatility of
the underlying stock and the expected dividends on it, and the risk-free interest rate over
the expected life or the option. ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, § 19 (Financial Accounting
Standards Bd. 1995) [hereinafter FAS 123]. FAS No. 123 required even companies
choosing to report under APB 25 to show the fair value impact of their option grants in
their financial footnotes as if FAS 123 were being used. Id. § 13. In a separate statement,
the FASB amended FAS 123's treatment of methods of transitioning to fair value
accounting and FAS 123's disclosure requirements. See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-
BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 148 passim
(Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1995). More recently, the FASB undertook a
project to resolve: (1) whether compensation paid in the form of equity instruments (and
other equity-based compensation arrangements) should be recognized in the financial
statements; and (2) how such compensation should be measured in the financial
statements. The ultimate goal is the establishment of one method for the recognition and
measurement of equity-based compensation transactions that would be followed by all
companies applying United States GAAP and international accounting standards. FASB,
PROJECT UPDATES: EQUITY BASED COMPENSATION, at http://www.fasb.org/project/
equity-based.comp.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
37. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
38. See I.R.C. § 422(b)(4) (2000).
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (as amended in 1996).
40. Id.
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an exercise price of $50 per share. For simplicity, now assume that
the options vest immediately and, further, that the CEO is successful
in persuading the compensation committee to grant the options while
the CEO knows, but shortly before any public announcement is
made, that the Food and Drug Administration has decided to
approve for commercial sale a promising drug developed by the
company. If, upon announcement of the news, the company's stock
price rises by forty percent to $70, the dollar value attributable to the
fact that the option exercise price was set at $50, instead of its full-
information price of $70, is $8 million [($70-$50) x 400,000]. In other
words, timing the option grant to precede the release of good
corporate news enhanced the option's value.
The inclusion of only outside (non-employee) directors who are
considered to be independent of management (independent
directors) on compensation committees limits the influence managers
can bring to bear on executive compensation matters. Numerous
forces encourage compensation committees to be composed of
independent directors. These forces include recently adopted
modifications to the listing standards of the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and the Nasdaq Stock Market that require,
within prescribed transition periods, the compensation committee of
listed companies to be composed entirely of independent directors.41
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code also encourages
companies to appoint outside directors to their compensation
committees.42 Under that provision, publicly held corporations are
generally not permitted to deduct compensation exceeding $1 million
paid to their CEOs or the next four highest compensated officers.43
An exception to this limit exists for performance-based compensation
payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more pre-
established performance goals, but only if, among other
requirements, the performance goals are determined by a
41. NASDAQ, RECENT RULE CHANGES, at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Recent
RuleChanges.stm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); NYSE MANUAL, supra note 28, §§ 303A.00, 303A.05. The two sets of listing
standards define independence slightly differently, but have substantially the same
requirements. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 28, § 303A.02; see N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FINAL
NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES, (Nov. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/final corpgovrules.pdf, at 4-7 (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); NASDAQ, BULLETIN ON SEC APPROVAL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
RULES 1 (November 4, 2003), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/
NASDAQ%20Bulletin_ 110403.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
42. I.R.C. § 162(m).
43. Id. § 162(m)(1).
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compensation committee comprised solely of two or more outside
directors.'
Another influential factor in the composition of compensation
committees is Rule 16b-3,45 promulgated under section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").4 6 Section 16(b) is a
strict liability provision allowing recovery from insiders of any profits
from any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, within six months
of each other, involving equity securities of their company. 7 Under
Rule 16b-3, transactions between a company and its officers or
directors are exempt from section 16(b) if any of certain conditions
are met.48 The exemption relevant for purposes of this Article, and
the one most commonly used, is Rule 16b-3(d). 49  This provision
exempts grants of stock options or other acquisitions from the issuer
that have received advance approval by a committee of two or more
"Non-Employee Directors." 50
In 1992, the SEC adopted rules relating to the disclosure of
executive compensation that also encourage independent
compensation committees. According to these rules, companies must
disclose in certain filings specified information regarding relationships
of compensation committee members potentially bearing on the
44. Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i). For purposes of section 162(m), the term "outside
directors" is defined in section 1.162-27(e)(3) of the Treasury Regulations. It specifies
that a director is an "outside director" if the director: (1) is not a current employee of the
company; (2) is not a former employee of the company who receives compensation for
prior services; (3) has not been an officer of the company; and (4) does not receive
compensation from the company, either directly or indirectly, in any capacity other than as
a director. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(3).
45. SEC Rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (2002).
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).
47. Id.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3.
49. Id. § 240.16b-3(d).
50. In order to qualify as a Non-Employee Director, a person must not: (1) currently
be an officer or employee of the issuer or a parent or subsidiary of the issuer; (2) receive
compensation, directly or indirectly, from the issuer or a parent or subsidiary of the issuer
for services rendered as a consultant or in any capacity other than a director, except for an
amount that does not exceed $60,000 (the threshold for which disclosure would be
required under Item 404(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402); (3) possess any
interest in any other transaction for which disclosure would be required pursuant to Item
404(a) of Regulation S-K; or (4) be engaged in a business relationship with the issuer or its
subsidiaries that would be disclosable under Item 404(b) of Regulation S-K. Id. § 240.16b-
3(b). Although these standards resemble the "outside director" standards of I.R.C.
§ 162(m), they are independent of them. Id. § 240.16b-3(d)(1). Rule 16b-3(d) does not
exempt "Discretionary Transactions," defined as a volitional intra-plan transfer involving
an issuer equity securities fund or a cash withdrawal funded by a volitional disposition of
an issuer equity security. See id. § 240.16b-3(b), (d); see also PETER J. ROMEO & ALAN L.
DYE, COMPREHENSIVE SEcTION 16 OUTLINE 322 (2001).
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independence of executive compensation decisions. 1 Specifically,
corporations must identify each member of the compensation
committee who: (1) was an officer or employee of the company or
any of its subsidiaries during the last fiscal year; (2) was formerly an
officer of the company or any of its subsidiaries; or (3) had certain
financial or business ties to the company during the last fiscal year. 2
The company is also required to describe any interlocking
relationships between its executive officers and the executive officers
of another company. 3
Finally, institutional shareholders and other influential bodies
have demanded the application of stricter membership standards to
compensation committees.54 In response to ever-increasing levels of
executive compensation during the late 1980s and early 1990s,11 these
constituents began publishing policy statements on executive
compensation practices and submitting shareholder proposals
promoting compensation committees composed solely of outside
directors.56
Taken together, the foregoing factors have already succeeded in
persuading many public companies to appoint compensation
committees whose members are entirely independent of
management. There are serious questions, however, about how
independent-minded so-called "independent" directors really are.
Indeed, both theory and evidence suggest that, despite their nominal
independence, compensation committee members may be subject to
51. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(j).
52. Id. § 229.402(j)(1).
53. Id. § 229.402(j)(3).
54. See, e.g., TIAA-CREF, TIAA-CREF POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/libra/governance/ (2000) ("The company's
executive compensation program should be under the direction and oversight of a
committee of the board of directors consisting of independent directors...") (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Other influential bodies also recommend that
compensation committees be independent of management. See COMM. ON CORP. LAWS,
AM. BAR ASS'N, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 43 (3d ed. 2001) ("The
compensation committee should be composed solely of nonmanagement directors.").
55. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 847.
56. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 22, at 278-79; Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for
Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts 4
(June 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/000613500.pdf?
abstractid=60956 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Deon Strickland et al., A
Requiem for the USA: Is Small Shareholder Monitoring Effective?, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 319,
328-30 (1996).
57. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MANUAL 1:A-16
(2002).
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managerial influence 8.5
The potential for managers to engage in opportunistic behavior
in large corporations has long been apparent to legal scholars. 9 This
potential is especially likely to be realized in the stock option award
process. The reasons for this begin with the process of board member
selection itself, from whose ranks members of the compensation
committee are appointed. Directors are elected each year at the
annual meeting of shareholders.6" Publicly held corporations often
have nominating committees composed of independent directors
whose function is to recommend to the board candidates for all
directorships to be filled.6" "The nomination function assumes
particular importance because ... nomination by the board is
normally tantamount to election. "62
While not a member of the nominating committee, the CEO of a
company plays an active role in the selection process. The CEO is
generally expected to recommend and discuss candidates with the
nominating committee and to recruit candidates for the board.63 By
one estimate, eighty-nine percent of nominating committees "depend
on the recommendations of the chairman of the board-in many
cases the CEO-to select board members."'  Board members who
58. See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
59. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 277-87 (discussing the degree of
management control over the corporation). More recently, Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried,
and David Walker have put forward a "managerial power" model of executive
compensation that predicts that managers will systematically use their power to influence
boards to give them compensation packages that are suboptimal, i.e., that fail to establish
incentives for managers to maximize shareholder wealth. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al.,
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 751, 784-85 (2002). But see Murphy, supra note 2, at 858 (explaining the
prevalence of option-based compensation in the United States on the alternative basis of
options' low perceived cost).
60. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2001).
61. See AM. LAW INST., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.04, at 121, 123 (1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; see
also Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications
Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249, 270,
274 (2003) (requiring disclosure in proxy statements of information regarding director
nomination procedures). But see Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg.
60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249, 274) (proposing
new Rule 14a-1I to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 granting security holders a limited
right to nominate directors).
62. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 61, § 3A.04, at 123.
63. Id. § 3A.04, at 122.
64. Walter J. Salmon, Crisis Prevention: How to Gear Up Your Board, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 68, 71; see also Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO
Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN.
1829, 1851 (1999) (describing CEO influence over the board).
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are hand-picked by the CEO are often senior executives at other
companies65 or individuals who share the same world-view as the
CEO.6  The result is that even independent directors may be
predisposed toward insiders.
Informational asymmetries between managers and compensation
committee members also play a role in conferring upon managers a
strategic advantage in compensation decisions.67 In particular, the
CEO, supported by senior human resources executives, generally
makes specific recommendations to the compensation committee
regarding the compensation of the company's officers.68 Although
the compensation committee should independently and objectively
evaluate these recommendations, if the CEO's recommendations are
thorough and well-supported, they will naturally receive deference.69
Compensation committee members are also at a disadvantage
relative to managers in terms of their expertise in compensation
matters. To be effective, a compensation committee member must be
knowledgeable in the areas of compensation design and basic
accounting and tax matters. However, as one author in the executive
compensation field put it, "Unfortunately, too few committee
members are well schooled in executive pay programs before joining
the committee . 70 Compounding the expertise problem are the
time constraints of directors, including compensation committee
members. The vast majority of directors are not professional
directors as they are often otherwise fully employed.71 Members of
65. A recent survey found, for example, that one quarter of the members of the
compensation committees it studied were CEOs of other companies. CONFERENCE BD.,
THE COMPENSATION COMMITrEE OF THE BOARD: BEST PRACTICES FOR
ESTABLISHING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 19 (2001).
66. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence
Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 389 (2002) (discussing reasons for which
independent directors might be predisposed to favor insiders).
67. See, e.g., Tom Giles & Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Qwest Directors Outlined
'Credibility' Gap for Nacchio in 2001, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 2, 2002 (reporting results
of survey of Qwest directors in which comments about former CEO Joseph Nacchio
included references to "haphazard" information flows and inability of board to "perform
basic governance responsibilities") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
68. LAWRENCE K. CAGNEY, BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., COMPENSATION
COMMITTEES A-7 (1998); CONFERENCE BD., supra note 65, at 23-24.
69. Carol J. Loomis, This Stuff Is Wrong, FORTUNE, June 25, 2001, at 73, 74-80
(suggesting that compensation committee members are reluctant to micro-manage
management).
70. ELLIG, supra note 15, at 511. Ironically, this problem is exacerbated by factors
encouraging independent compensation committees because management directors are
likely to be more knowledgeable about compensation matters and about the company
than are independent directors. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 65, at 19.
71. Bainbridge, supra note 66, at 388.
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compensation committees meet only occasionally and do not analyze
in detail compensation issues.72  Given competing demands,
compensation committee members are even more inclined to rely
heavily on management's proposals.
Due to the complexity of executive compensation matters,
compensation committees typically rely on professional compensation
consultants for advice.73 Although using consultants alleviates the
expertise and time limitations that face directors, consultants do not
necessarily introduce objectivity into the review process. Frequently,
consultants are hired to evaluate the compensation of the CEO who
hired them.74 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to believe that
a consultant would challenge management's recommendations to a
meaningful extent. Instead, compensation consultants are more likely
to work to justify management's recommendations.
Informal and empirical data suggest that the foregoing factors
do, indeed, allow managers to exert influence over compensation
matters. In an interview of seven directors of large companies who
were promised anonymity, numerous comments underscored the
pressures that CEOs can bring to bear on compensation committee
members. One CEO described bluntly his ability to win approval for
favorable compensation arrangements:
On my own board we have very sophisticated people, and we
expose the full board to what's going on about compensation.
Even so, since I know more than they do about this subject
75
While acknowledging that modern board members are vigilant, the
above-quoted CEO nevertheless felt that boards were at a strategic
disadvantage relative to management when overseeing management-
supported initiatives:
I think the day of packing the board with patsies is over, if for
no other reason than appearances. In any case, the odds are so
stacked in favor of management that you don't need patsies.76
Another executive with wide experience on boards spoke in the
same vein:
72. GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 224 (1991).
73. CAGNEY, supra note 68, at A-15 to A-16.
74. Id. at A-16; CRYSTAL, supra note 72, at 220.
75. Loomis, supra note 69, at 74-80.
76. Id. at 74.
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When it comes to relating pay to performance, compensation
committees are really in the pockets of CEOs. There are all
kinds of cozy relationships involved. And when a CEO wants
the rules changed as to how people are paid, the rules simply
get changed....
... Basically, what people understand they have to do is go
along with management, because if they don't they won't be
part of the club. You sort of get rolled over by the system even
if you try to do well. What it comes down to is that directors
aren't really independent. CEOs don't want independent
directors.77
Recent empirical evidence is consistent with the view that
managers exert influence over executive compensation decisions
notwithstanding the presence of independent directors on
compensation committees. These studies fail to find statistical
support for the proposition that increased representation of
independent directors on compensation committees curtails CEO
pay. 78
Certainly, bias of compensation committee members in favor of
management is not assured and can easily be overstated.7 9 Not all
independent directors are susceptible to managerial influence. Nor
are all independent directors unable to monitor executive
compensation matters in an informed and dispassionate manner. All
that it is necessary to establish to warrant further inquiring into the
opportunistic timing of stock option awards, however, is that
independent directors will often be subject to strategic
disadvantages-whether as a result of institutional pressures,
77. Id. at 75.
78. See generally Ronald C. Anderson & John M. Bizjak, An Empirical Examination
of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay, 27
J. BANKING & FIN. 1323, 1346 (2003) (finding that the sensitivity of CEO pay and equity is
not affected by the fraction of outsiders on the compensation committee); Catherine M.
Daily et al., Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of CEO
Compensation, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 209 (1998) (finding "no evidence that 'captured'
directors led to greater levels of, or changes in, CEO compensation"); Harry A. Newman
& Haim A. Mozes, Does the Composition of the Compensation Committee Influence CEO
Compensation Practices?, 28 FIN. MGMT. 41 (1999) (concluding that compensation is no
greater when the compensation committee is comprised of insiders). But see Murphy,
supra note 2, at 851-54 (supporting the theory that outside directors help curb CEO pay).
79. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 228 (2002)
(noting that independent directors have affirmative incentives to monitor management
effectively so that the company does not perform adversely on their watch).
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informational asymmetries, or otherwise-relative to managers that
permit managers to influence them to grant non-periodic stock option
awards to key executives at favorable times.
II. OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING OF STOCK OPTION AWARDS
A. Evidence
If the foregoing account that managers can, even in the presence
of independent compensation committees, influence the terms of
their compensation, is accurate, then managers will be able to time
their option grants to precede favorable news announcements,
thereby reducing the riskiness and increasing the value of their
options.8 0 There are, of course, constraints that check the extent to
which the level and structure of executive compensation can deviate
from what would be optimal for shareholders. At some point, even
directors who are inclined to favor management in the compensation
process will refuse to approve a compensation package, or
shareholders might seek to impose limits on executive
compensation. 81 To circumvent such pressures, managers will want to
enhance their compensation as discreetly as possible. By
"camouflaging" 2 elements of their pay, managers can maximize their
compensation while minimizing adverse reaction. Timing option
grants is an especially attractive way to enhance executive
compensation both because it is difficult to detect and because it has
generally eluded attention.83
Empirical studies of stock price behavior following stock option
awards support the hypothesis that managers of public companies in
the United States systematically receive stock option awards with
favorable exercise prices. 4 Such exercise prices are favorable in the
sense that they are purportedly market prices on the date the options
are granted but do not reflect favorable nonpublic information on the
date of the award. If this information were to have been incorporated
into stock prices on the award dates, awards granted "at-the-money"
would have been made with exercise prices equal to the higher (full-
80. Yermack, supra note 7, at 453.
81. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 59, at 786-87 (referring to this constraint as the
"outrage" factor).
82. Bebchuk et al. use this term to describe the process by which managers are
inclined to extract economic rent, i.e., pay in excess of what would be optimal for
shareholders, while minimizing adverse shareholder "outrage." Id. at 786-89.
83. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.




The evidence on the timing of executive stock option awards
relative to movements in stock prices is consistent with two possible
theories. First, insiders might manipulate the timing of the release of
information to the market by revealing good news after a given award
date. For example, an executive with favorable information about his
company who knows he will receive stock options on a pre-
established date can enhance the value of those options if he is able to
delay disclosure of positive news until after the options are granted
and the exercise price is established.85  Second, insiders might
manipulate the timing of award dates such that awards are made
before a given date on which good news is released.86
By distinguishing between option awards made on a predictable
schedule and those that are not, it is possible to test the foregoing
theories.87 Significant positive abnormal stock price returns following
predictable awards suggest opportunistic timing of disclosure around
award dates because, by definition, the award dates were fixed. The
same stock price behavior following unpredictable awards suggests
opportunistic timing of awards prior to positive news announcements.
In fact, empirical studies on stock price movements and option
awards suggest that both types of opportunistic behavior occur.88 The
85. For a discussion of evidence on manipulative disclosure around predictable award
dates, see generally Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to
Maximize Performance-based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incentives?, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 83 (2000).
86. Yermack, supra note 7, at 451.
87. For example, David Aboody and Ron Kasznik define "scheduled" awards as
those made periodically each year within one week of each other. Aboody & Kasznik,
supra note 30, at 81 n.8.
88. Id. at 98. During the sample period 1992-1996, Aboody and Kasznik investigate
stock price behavior around the time of 2,039 "scheduled" awards made to the CEOs of
572 firms to test whether CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around
award dates, rushing bad news forward ahead of awards and delaying the release of good
news until after awards. Id. at 74-76, 98. Aboody and Kasznik find evidence "that CEOs
of firms with scheduled awards make opportunistic voluntary disclosures that maximize
their stock option compensation." Id. at 98. Although the authors focus on scheduled
awards to mitigate the possibility that their findings are attributable to opportunistic
timing of awards around company news announcements, they replicate all of their tests
using the subsample of 1,402 awards made to the CEOs of 562 firms with unscheduled
awards. Id. at 86. Aboody and Kasznik found no evidence that the significant stock price
decreases (increases) in the period immediately before (after) the unscheduled awards
reflect an opportunistic disclosure strategy. Id. They therefore conclude that the
asymmetric stock price movements that they observe around option awards reflect: (1)
opportunistic timing of disclosures around award dates for firms with scheduled awards;
and (2) opportunistic timing of awards around disclosures for firms with unscheduled
awards. Id. at 76; see also Steven Balsam et al., Earnings Management Prior to Stock
Option Grants, (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (finding evidence that firms make income-
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remainder of this Part explores in greater detail the evidence that has
been gathered regarding the deliberate timing by insiders of stock
option awards before favorable news announcements.
In his study of 620 CEO stock option awards made by Fortune
500 companies in the 1992-93 and 1993-94 fiscal years, David
Yermack theorizes that CEOs influence the timing of their option-
based compensation to increase its value and reduce its riskiness.89
One testable prediction of Yermack's theory is that managers receive
option awards shortly before favorable firm-specific news pushes
their companies' stock prices higher.9" In fact, Yermack finds that
stock prices of companies in his sample begin rising just after CEOs
receive their option awards, with such stock prices exhibiting mean
cumulative abnormal returns ("CARs") over the next ten weeks.91
Cumulative abnormal returns thereafter level off and become
permanently embedded in stock prices. 2
As discussed above, Yermack's evidence of abnormal stock price
returns following option awards is consistent with the manipulation
by managers of either the timing of news announcements around
award dates or of award dates around news announcements.93 When
decreasing accruals to earnings prior to stock option grants), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=378440 (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Chauvin & Shenoy, supra note 30, at 73-74 (finding evidence
consistent with the proposition that executives time the release of bad news shortly before
option grant dates in order to depress the exercise prices of their stock options).
89. Yermack, supra note 7, at 449, 453-54.
90. Id. at 454-55.
91. Id. Yermack does not find evidence that option awards are made following stock
price declines. Id. at 457-58. But see Chauvin & Shenoy, supra note 30, at 73-74
(reporting evidence to the contrary on the basis of a different market portfolio index).
Yermack's hypothesis does not, however, depend on whether stock prices move
downward before option awards because option recipients benefit from the timing of their
awards only if stock prices subsequently rise. Yermack, supra note 7, at 457-58.
92. Yermack, supra note 7, at 455-57. Yermack also considers and rejects numerous
competing explanations for his test results, including the possibilities that: (1) news of
options being awarded leads to increased stock purchases, which itself drives stock prices
higher; (2) shareholders implicitly acquiesce in rewarding deserving CEOs by allowing
them to time favorably their option awards; (3) boards deliberately award options to their
companies' CEOs before favorable news as a way of enhancing the incentive impact of the
options or as a way of rewarding CEOs for their role in generating the favorable news; and
(4) companies and executives enjoy tax benefits from the award of options that move into
the money relative to cash compensation. Id. at 467-72. Yermack rejects the first of these
explanations because he finds no evidence of increased trading around stock option award
dates. Id. at 470. He dismisses the remaining theories for several reasons, including what
he perceives as their legal questionability, bluntness as a device for incentivizing
executives, and lack of evidence that firms target the optimal exercise price of executive
stock options. Id. at 471-72.
93. The suggestion that managers influence grant dates is supported by Yermack's
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Yermack disaggregated his data into predictable and unpredictable
award dates,94 he found that both subsamples exhibited positive and
significant mean CARs, but that the unpredictable awards had higher
mean CARs.95 In other words, both strategies enhance option values,
but manipulating award date timing is more effective than
manipulating the timing of disclosure.
There is also evidence in the form of data on the timing of
"underwater option" re-pricing to support the proposition that
managers influence the timing of option awards to their financial
advantage. An underwater option is an option to purchase stock at
an exercise price that is above the stock's current market price.96 As
discussed in Part I.B, exercise prices for stock options are typically set
at the market price. When stock options go underwater, the options
are more likely to expire worthless.
Firms with options that are underwater confront incentive and
retention issues. 97 As a result, companies often wish to reduce the
exercise prices of underwater options to the prevailing market price
of the underlying stock. Until recently, it was common for companies
simply to reduce the exercise prices, or "reprice," stock options to
preserve their value to employees. Effective July 1, 2000, for any
option that was repriced after December 15, 1998, however, any
options a company offers to reprice are subject to "variable
accounting," which requires the company to "mark-to-market" all
options included in the repricing offer at the end of each quarterly
reporting period.98 As a result, instead of the compensation expense
of the option being measured on the grant date, any increase in the
stock price over the exercise price as of each quarterly measurement
date while the option is outstanding results in a compensation
findings that the more influence the CEO exerts over the governing body awarding the
grants, the greater are the CARs following the awards. Id. at 459-62.
94. Yermack classifies awards as "predictable" if the awards are made in each of the
two fiscal years of his sample, with the two awards being separated by at least eleven
months but no more than thirteen months. Id. at 459.
95. Id.
96. Gary N. Sutton & Jeffrey P. Donahue, Repricing Underwater Stock Options,
VENTURE CAPITAL J., Nov. 1, 2001, at 18, available at 2001 WL 2277879.
97. An executive whose options are severely underwater may believe that no amount
of effort will bring the options back into the money, thereby severing the link between
performance and pay as to those options. Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does
Performance-Based Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 267-68 (1999). In addition, if the executive holds underwater options
that remain unvested, his financial incentive to remain with his current employer
diminishes. Sutton & Donahue, supra note 96, at 19.
98. See Interpretation No. 44 Accounting for Certain Transactions Involving Stock
Compensation, An Interpretation of APB Opinion No. 25 (2000) 38-39.
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expense to the company. Companies that wish to reduce the exercise
prices of their options without subjecting the options to variable
accounting must insert a six-month waiting period between the dates
that the underwater options are cancelled and those on which the
replacement options are issued.99
Unlike the decision whether to reprice stock options, the timing
of option repricing has received scant attention. Yet it is the price of
the stock on the date of the repricing that redetermines the value of
the option. Given that the decision-making process for option
repricing is the same as that for granting an option, evidence that
stock option repricing precedes favorable movements in the
underlying stock is consistent with the theory that executives
opportunistically manage the timing of the initial option grant.
In their study on the timing of stock option repricing, Callaghan
et al. examined a sample of 236 repricing events from 1992 through
1997 involving high level managers. 1°° The authors found that stock
prices of firms that repriced their options exhibited statistically
significant declines for several months before the repricing and
statistically significant increases after the repricing.1"' Callaghan et al.
conclude that "management tends to reprice options as the stock
price reaches a minimum, and just prior to a period with abnormal
positive returns. It seems unlikely that this pattern consistently
occurs by chance. '1 2
In summary, there is substantial evidence indicating that stock
option grants are systematically made just before stock prices
increase. Managers benefit from such timing because the exercise
price of their stock options is typically set on the grant date at the
then-prevailing price of the stock. Thus, when managers are eligible
to exercise their options, they enjoy not only any increase in stock
price resulting from events that occur after their grants but also
increases in stock price attributable to any events that occurred
before their grants but that were announced after the grant date. The
latter portion of the spread between the market price of the stock on
the date of exercise and the exercise price appears solely to be the
product of good timing.
99. See id. I[J 38-45.
100. Sandra R. Callaghan et al., The Timing of Option Repricing 1 (2002), available at
http://www.afajof.org/pdf/forthcoming/subramaniam.pdf (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
101. Id. at 13-14.
102. Id. at 16.
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B. Direct Costs to Shareholders of Favorably Timed Grants
The beneficial timing of stock option grants imposes direct costs
on shareholders. These costs are not the full cost of the options but
only the excess of the cost of a beneficially timed option over the cost
of a fully priced option (where the exercise price reflects inside
information). Offsetting this amount is the present value of any tax
benefits to the company resulting from the fact that the grant was
made at the lower exercise price. 103
The Black-Scholes option pricing formula is the most widely
used model for estimating the present value of stock options granted
by a company to its employees."° Although a precise derivation of
the sensitivity of the Black-Scholes option value to changes in the
exercise price of an option is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
possible to make some observations about it. First, a decrease in the
option's exercise price, other things equal, increases the value of the
option. Second, the upper bound of the wealth transfer from
shareholders to executives for a given reduction in an option's
exercise price is the product of the reduction in the exercise price and
the number of options granted.05 In other words, every dollar for
which the exercise price of an option is below its full-information
exercise price represents a maximum one dollar wealth transfer from
shareholders to executives.
Take the example given earlier in which a CEO is granted
options to purchase 400,000 shares at an exercise price of $50 per
share. 6 In that example, the options vested immediately and the
announcement that the FDA approved the company's new drug for
commercial sale raised the stock price to $70. If the option is
exercised, timing the grant before the release of the good corporate
news results in the CEO's purchasing the shares underlying the
option for $50, which is $20 less than the CEO would have paid had
the options been granted after the news release. The direct pre-tax
cost to shareholders of this benefit is $ 8 million.
Under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, however, upon
exercise of a nonqualified stock option, 10 7 a company is typically
103. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillian, Option-Based Compensation: Panacea or Pandora's
Box?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2001, at 118-20 (using the Black-Scholes method
to calculate present value).
105. Yermack, supra note 7, at 458; Chauvin & Shenoy, supra note 30, at 67.
106. See example discussed supra pp. 844-45.
107. A nonqualified stock option is a stock option that does not comply with the
requirements applicable to an incentive stock option. Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want
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entitled to a deduction equal to the difference between the market
price of the stock at the time of exercise and the exercise price of the
stock.108 Thus, to the extent that the exercise price is lower than it
would have been had the nonpublic information been incorporated
into it on the grant date, the company benefits from a greater
deduction. Assuming that this corporate tax benefit is a combined
state and federal rate of forty percent, the incremental deduction that
the insider grant generates for the company reduces the wealth
transfer to shareholders from failing to disclose the inside information
before the grant by $3.2 million to $4.8 million.
Of course, one can argue that in the more realistic scenario
where the options vest over time, various economic shocks may
reduce or eliminate the value of the below-market grant. Yermack,
however, finds that post-award CARs become permanently
embedded in stock prices. 09 Thus, good timing appears to benefit
managers at shareholder expense through the option exercise date.
Another possible objection to the claim that shareholders suffer
direct costs associated with favorably timed option grants is that the
value to managers associated with favorable timing would, if
unavailable, be demanded by managers in consideration for their
services in some other form, such as salary. In other words, suppose
that a given CEO commands total compensation of $5 million a year.
As one component of his compensation package, the CEO might be
willing to accept either $1 million in value attributable to the
favorable timing of an option grant or $1 million in salary. In other
words, favorable timing may not operate to enhance executive
compensation but rather to substitute for an alternative form of pay.
While the possibility of such a substitution effect exists, it seems
unlikely. If favorably timed options were a substitute for other forms
of compensation, one would expect to observe companies awarding
discount options during periods when there is no significant favorable
information pending release. Discount options are similar to
favorably timed market options in that they are in the money at the
time of issuance, while favorably timed market options are highly
likely to be in the money upon expected announcement of expected
positive news. However, discount options are only rarely granted. 11°
Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper
Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 147 (2000).
108. I.R.C. § 83 (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7 (as amended in 1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
7T (temporary provision applying to all grants after July 2, 2003).
109. Yermack, supra note 7, at 455-57.
110. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J.
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Rather than serve as a substitute for other forms of
compensation, it is more likely that favorably timed option grants
represent a way for managers to enhance their compensation. As
discussed in Part I, managers have incentives to camouflage their pay
to the extent it deviates from that associated with the optimal
contract. By timing option grants, managers can enhance their
compensation with minimal potential for detection by outsiders.111
III. SITUATING STOCK OPTION AWARDS WITHIN THE LAW OF
INSIDER TRADING
Part I.B of this Article made the case that managers can exercise
considerable influence over key elements of their compensation,
including the timing of stock option awards. The evidence reviewed
in Part II.A is consistent with the theory that executives do in fact use
their influence over the option award process to secure exercise prices
that do not incorporate fully favorable nonpublic information known
to them on grant dates. In other words, managers are able to obtain
options that are "mispriced" to their advantage. By influencing the
timing of executive option grants, managers can systematically
increase the value of their stock option awards and reduce their risk
based solely on the future release of favorable nonpublic information.
As described in Part II.B, shareholders bear direct costs associated
with these mispriced options. This Part considers whether the grant
of executive options pending disclosure of material nonpublic
information gives rise to insider trading liability under Rule 10b-5,
confronting the most difficult issues such a claim will likely raise.
A. The Fiduciary Duty and Deception Requirements of Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act delegates broad rulemaking
authority to the SEC to protect investors and the public from the use
of any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.1 2 Pursuant to this
authority, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which broadly proscribes
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.1 3 As
Accr. & ECON. 3,25-26 (2002).
111. Even if a substitution effect did exist, the fact remains that favorably timed option
grants are a disguised form of compensation to the extent their compensatory function is
generally not disclosed.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
113. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002). Two other provisions of the
federal securities laws that regulate insider trading deserve mention. As discussed above,
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act allows an issuer of equity securities to
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Professor Steve Thel states, "[Rule 10b-5] is as broad as almost any
statute, a sort of long-arm provision in which the SEC forbids
everything the statute gives it power to forbid." ''1 Given the open-
ended nature of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the courts have been
particularly influential in developing their scope.115
In its initial incarnation, modern-day federal insider trading law
held that an insider possessing material nonpublic information must
either disclose such information before trading or abstain from
trading until the information has been disclosed. The earliest
conception of the "disclose or abstain rule," as it is commonly known,
was based on the premise underlying the decision of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co."6 that all
members of the investing public are entitled to equal access to
material information." 7 In Chiarella v. United States, 118 however, the
Supreme Court limited the application of the disclose or abstain rule
to only those instances in which a person has an affirmative disclosure
obligation prior to trading.1 9
recover short-swing profits of an insider. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
Because, under Rule 16b-3(d), a stock option grant made by an independent
compensation committee is generally exempt from section 16(b), and because section
16(b) reaches only transactions that occur within six months of each other, it is of limited
relevance to the award of executive stock options. Rule 14e-3, promulgated by the SEC
pursuant to its authority under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(2000), makes it illegal to trade on the basis of material nonpublic information of a tender
offer if knowledge of the offer comes from the offering party, the issuer of the securities,
or any officer, director, partner, or employee of either the offering person or the issuer. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a). Under this rule, it is illegal, for example, for a tippee of a bidder to
trade in either the bidder's or the target's stock even if the tippee owes no fiduciary duty
to the shareholders of the target company and regardless of the motive of the tipper. Id.
Rule 14e-3 is based on the SEC's view that trading by persons in possession of material
nonpublic information relating to a tender offer results in unfair disparities in market
information and market disruption. Tender Offers, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,412 (Sept. 12,
1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240). Again, however, it is applicable only in limited
circumstances.
114. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 463 (1990) (citations omitted). Because the scope of Rule 10b-
5 is coextensive with the coverage of section 10(b), I refer to the rule and the statute
interchangeably. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002).
115. Generally, the courts have held that a Rule 10b-5 claim consists of five principal
elements: (1) fraud or deceit (2) by any person (3) in connection with (4) the purchase or
sale (5) of any security. The fraud or deceit element in turn requires a showing of the
elements of scienter, materiality, reliance, causation, and damages. THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.2.1, at 770 (3d ed. 1995).
116. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
117. Id. at 848.
118. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
119. Id. at 228. The disclose or abstain rule, as so limited, is hereinafter referred to as
the "classical theory."
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In so limiting the disclose or abstain rule, the Chiarella Court
cited with approval the SEC's conception of an underlying fiduciary
obligation in an earlier administrative ruling.2 In In re Cady,
Roberts & Co.,121 the SEC decided that a corporate insider must
abstain from trading in the shares of her corporation unless she has
first disclosed all material inside information known to her.122 This
obligation to disclose inside information or abstain from trading on it
was deemed to apply, however, only because of the insider's "special
relationship" with a corporation and its shareholders.123 In other
words, an insider must disclose or abstain from trading only when she
is under some independent duty to do so as a result of a "fiduciary or
other similar relation of trust and confidence. 124
In Dirks v. SEC,125 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in
Chiarella that a duty to disclose arising from a specific relationship
between the parties must exist before there can be a Rule 10b-5
violation. 126 Dirks worked with a firm specializing in the investment
analysis of insurance companies.1 27 Secrist, a former officer of Equity
Funding of America ("Equity Funding"), a corporation that sold life
insurance and mutual funds, alleged to Dirks that the company was
fraudulently booking assets.128 While investigating these allegations,
Dirks disclosed the information to numerous investors, some of
whom then liquidated their Equity Funding holdings. 129  The Wall
Street Journal ultimately exposed the fraud publicly,130 and Equity
Funding went into receivership.' The SEC censured Dirks for
aiding and abetting violations of Rule 10b-5 by repeating the
allegations of fraud made to him to members of the investment
community who sold their Equity Funding stock.32
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the censure, but the
Supreme Court reversed.13' The Supreme Court held that Dirks did
120. Id. at 226-27 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
121. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
122. In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
123. Id.
124. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
125. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
126. Id. at 654, 657-58.
127. Id. at 648.
128. Id. at 649.
129. Id.
130. William E. Blundell, A Scandal Unfolds; Some Assets Missing, Insurance Called
Bogus at Equity Funding Life, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1973, at 1.
131. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650.
132. Id. at 650-51.
133. Id. at 652, 657.
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not have a relationship with the stockholders of Equity Funding that
gave rise to a duty to disclose or abstain. Even if Dirks, as a tippee,
was deemed to inherit his tipper's fiduciary duties, there could be no
violation because Secrist did not personally benefit from revealing the
corporation's fraudulent activities. To the contrary, he was motivated
by a desire to expose the fraud.134 Absent the requisite fiduciary
relationship, Dirks was not subject to the disclose or abstain rule.135
Taken together, Chiarella and Dirks make it clear that insiders,
because of their special relationship of trust and confidence with
shareholders, must disclose material inside information before trading
or abstain from trading and thus avoid making "secret profits. 136
Dirks went on, however, to note that not all breaches of fiduciary
duty in connection with a securities transaction implicate Rule 10b-
5.137 Dirks followed Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green 3 8 in requiring
that some manipulation or deception be effected by the breach to
support a violation. 39 In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court stated that a
claim of fiduciary breach creates Rule 10b-5 liability "only if the
conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive'
within the meaning of[Section 1O(b)].""'
Unfortunately, the foregoing formulation is ill-suited to handling
the propriety of timing the grant of stock options prior to the release
of favorable inside information. First, it fails to specify the source-
state or federal-of an insider's underlying fiduciary duty obligation.
Second, it does not identify important details needed to assess
whether a trade is deceptive. As discussed below, these gaps present
the possibility that board knowledge of inside information at the time
of the grant-a factor often present when grants are awarded-can
insulate the grant from either constituting a breach of fiduciary duty
or being deceptive.
Professor Stephen Bainbridge has argued that the fiduciary duty
that must be breached before there can be a Rule 10b-5 violation is
134. Id. at 666-67.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 654.
137. Id.
138. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
139. According to the Dirks Court, "[i]n an inside-trading case this fraud derives from
the 'inherent unfairness involved where one takes advantage' of 'information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.' "
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968)).
140. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
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the duty to refrain from self-dealing in nonpublic information. 4 1
Under this view, insiders are obligated to use their access to
confidential information solely for corporate purposes. 42  The
Delaware Supreme Court described this duty in Guth v. Loft, Inc.,143
stating that:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A
public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has
established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or
director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous
observance of his duty .... The rule that requires an undivided
and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there
shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest. 44
As Professor Bainbridge pointed out, however, even if we
conclude that the fiduciary duty relevant to insider trading liability is
that against self-dealing, the source of that duty still needs to be
ascertained. 45 Specifically, it must be determined whether the federal
prohibition incorporates state law fiduciary duty concepts or creates a
unique rule of federal common law that applies uniformly across all
states. The source of the fiduciary duty informs its substance,
including to whom the duty is owed and how it can be discharged.
Chiarella and Dirks and, more recently, United States v.
146 fO'Hagan, suggest a federal source underlying the federal insider
trading prohibition. For example, Chiarella refers to a relationship
that "the Commission recognized ... of trust and confidence between
the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have
obtained confidential information by reason of their position within
that corporation.' ' 47  Similarly, Dirks noted that In re Cady
141. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1200 (1995).
142. Id.
143. 5 A.2d 503,510 (Del. 1939).
144. Id.
145. Bainbridge, supra note 141, at 1201-02.
146. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
147. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (emphasis added); see also
Ray J. Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal Relationships As a Basis for
Insider Trading Violations, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 467, 473-74 (2002) (arguing that the
Chiarella Court created a uniform fiduciary duty for insiders under Rule lOb-5 when it
described an insider's fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain from selling stock to persons
who previously may not have been stockholders in the corporation, despite the absence of
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recognized that the common law in only "some" jurisdictions imposed
a duty of disclosure on corporate insiders when trading securities but
went on to hold that a breach of that duty established the elements of
a Rule 10b-5 violation.148  In reaffirming Chiarella and Dirks,
O'Hagan also referred to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading by
corporate insiders without reference to any state law duty. 149
Nevertheless, the notion that federal law should supply the
substance of the fiduciary duty requirement of insider trading law is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green. In Santa Fe, the Court cautioned against using Rule
10b-5 to create a federal common law fiduciary duty. 5 ° The concern
articulated in Santa Fe was that application of a federal fiduciary rule
against self-dealing would bring a wide variety of corporate conduct
traditionally left to state regulation within Rule 10b-5.1' The Court
was wary about using Rule 10b-5 to federalize state corporate law
absent a clear indication of congressional intent. 5 ' While the
O'Hagan Court claimed its decision was consistent with Santa Fe, its
discussion of the matter fails to address the portion of Santa Fe
dealing with the Court's reluctance to displace state corporate law
through Rule 10b-5. 53 Thus, although O'Hagan suggests that there
exists a federal common law fiduciary duty requiring corporate
insiders to abstain from self-dealing in their companies' securities
while in possession of material nonpublic information, the issue is not
free from doubt.154 Accordingly, this Part addresses the substance of
the fiduciary duty preventing insiders from self-dealing in their
corporations' securities under both state and federal law and the
implications of each for favorably timed option grants.
1. State Law Fiduciary Duties
When the SEC decided In re Cady, only some states required
insiders to disclose material nonpublic information before trading.1 55
Under what has been referred to as the "majority rule," '156 insiders
state law authority for this proposition).
148. Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983).
149. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
150. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 479.
153. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655-56.
154. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 79, at 556-61.
155. In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 n.13 (1961).
156. See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 16.2.2
(1996 & Supp. 2002) (describing the "majority rule"); Barbara A. Ash, State Regulation of
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owed no duty to disclose any information in their private dealings
with shareholders. The so-called "majority rule" receded in
importance, however, as an increasing number of courts adopted the
"special facts" doctrine, announced by the Supreme Court in Strong
v. Repide.157 Under the special facts doctrine, in a face-to-face
transaction, as opposed to a transaction conducted on an impersonal
exchange, special circumstances can render nondisclosure by an
insider unconscionable.'58 In addition to application of the special
facts doctrine, some states required disclosure of nonpublic
information to shareholders in all face-to-face transactions, even in
the absence of special circumstances.15 9
Thus, at the time of the SEC's ruling in In re Cady, state law
provided only limited remedies to a shareholder of a corporation
whose officers or directors engaged in insider trading. First, not all
states recognized an insider's duty to disclose material nonpublic
information before trading.160 Second, in those states that did impose
such a duty, the duty arose only in face-to-face transactions.1
61
Finally, in most of the cases in which shareholders prevailed against
insiders, the insiders had gone beyond failing to disclose material
nonpublic information and had actively misled shareholders.162
Since In re Cady was decided, the most important development
in state insider trading law has been the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in Diamond v. Oreamuno.163  There, insiders
possessing unfavorable, undisclosed information sold their shares in
market transactions. Though no specific harm to the corporation was
alleged, the court permitted a derivative action on behalf of the
corporation, suggesting it may have suffered harm to its reputation.
164
It also suggested its holding could be justified in part by the then-
inadequate federal remedies for insider trading. 165 When, however,
Insider Trading-A Timely Resurgence?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 399 (1988) ("Under what
has been referred to as the 'majority rule,' an officer or director owed no duty to disclose
any information even when the trading transaction was with an existing shareholder.").
157. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
158. Id. at 431-33.
159. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903) (holding that a director, when
purchasing stock from a shareholder, is under the same disclosure obligations as a
fiduciary).
160. See Bainbridge, supra note 141, at 1221.
161. See Ash, supra note 156, at 402 & n.72; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 156,
§ 16.2.3.1.
162. See Ash, supra note 156, at 399-400 & n.55.
163. 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
164. Id. at 912-13.
165. Id. at 915.
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the perceived gap in federal law was filled by Texas Gulf Sulphur and
its progeny, the evolution of state common law regulation of insider
trading was effectively aborted.166
Given that state insider trading law is both non-uniform and only
partially developed, an insider's duty of disclosure in the context of a
stock option award is more readily analyzed under general state
common law principles of fiduciary duty. As already described, the
state common law duty of loyalty prohibits unfair self-dealing by
corporate officers and directors and thus proscribes them from using
their privileged positions to advance their personal interests at
shareholder expense. 167  The key to upholding an interested
transaction under state law is its approval by a neutral decision-
making body-namely, independent directors, shareholders, or the
courts.168  State statutes, such as section 144(a) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law,169 provide a safe harbor for corporate
officers and directors to prevent conflicts of interest from voiding
corporate actions. Under section 144(a), a transaction between a
corporation and its officers or directors will not be void or voidable
solely because it is a self-dealing transaction if the transaction is
ratified by a majority of disinterested directors of the board or
committee charged with authorizing the transaction or by the
shareholders. 7 ° Such ratification is valid, however, only if the
material facts as to the relationship or interest and as to the
transaction have been disclosed or are known by the ratifying party. 7'
In the absence of such disclosure, the transaction can be rendered
non-voidable only if it was fair to the corporation as of the time it was
authorized. 72
Common law rules and state statutes such as section 144(a) thus
permit approval by a majority of informed and disinterested directors
to remove the taint from a self-dealing transaction.'73 Accordingly,
166. See Ash, supra note 156, at 403.
167. See supra note 141-43 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co., 731 A.2d 342, 367 (Del. Ch. 1998) (noting that
shareholders may in certain circumstances be served notwithstanding the fact that the deal
might be characterized as an interested transaction).
169. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 144(a)(1).
172. Id. § 144(a)(3).
173. The precise implications of ratification for an interested transaction is
controversial and depends heavily on the nature of the transaction. See generally Mary A.
Jacobson, Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects of Shareholder
Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 984 (1996) (providing "a critical analysis of
Delaware's current ratification doctrine"); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical
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courts applying state fiduciary duty law have generally held that
where disinterested directors approve a transaction in which an
officer or director has a conflict of interest, their action will be
reviewed by the courts pursuant to the business judgment rule. 174 In
other words, the directors will be presumed to have acted in good
faith, on an informed basis, and in the honest belief that their actions
are in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.175
The foregoing principles make clear that, in analyzing a
favorably timed stock option grant under state law fiduciary duty
principles, knowledge of inside information by the executive receiving
the option or the board is relevant. Consider first the executive who:
(1) uses his influence over the timing of an option award to obtain an
exercise price with respect to the options that does not fully reflect
corporate information that he has obtained as a result of his insider
status; and (2) does not disclose the information to an otherwise
uninformed board prior to the board's grant of the options. The
executive cannot be presumed to know how disclosure of the
information would affect the board's grant decision. Because the
inside information in the optionee's possession would increase the
market price of the stock underlying the option if disclosed publicly,
and therefore the value of the options, a board possessing the
information might choose to grant the executive fewer options, grant
the executive the same number of options but reduce another
element of his compensation, or simply delay granting the options
until after the information is revealed. Thus, by failing to disclose the
information to the board, the executive places his own interests above
those of the corporation and its shareholders-a breach of the duty of
loyalty.
An analogous situation arose in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.176
In that case, certain top Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ("TGS") executives
received stock options while in possession of the nonpublic material
information that their company had discovered a valuable mineral
Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002)
(discussing tensions in Delaware law surrounding effects of ratification of interested
transactions). Generally, however, compensation transactions with insiders following full
disclosure and approval by disinterested directors are reviewed under a business judgment
standard. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Self-interested Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J.
CORP. L. 997, 1005 (1988).
174. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., 1 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 271 (5th ed. 1998 & Supp. 2001) (citing cases).
175. See id. at 25.
176. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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deposit on land owned by it.'77 Because TGS was seeking to purchase
an adjacent portion of the land on which the deposit was discovered,
information of the discovery was dispensed only on a "need-to-know"
basis, and not even the company's board or the board's stock option
committee was aware of it at the time of the grant. 7 8 According to
the Texas Gulf Sulphur court, in order to comply with Rule 10b-5, the
option recipients would have either had to disclose the inside
information in their possession to Texas Gulf Sulphur's stock option
committee or reject the options.'79 The executives failed to make the
required disclosure, and the court rescinded the option grants. 8 °
The Texas Gulf Sulphur court did not give any details as to the
source-state or federal-of the disclosure requirement it articulated.
The court simply stated:
[W]e would hold with the district court that a member of top
management ... is required, before accepting a stock option, to
disclose [to the corporation's stock option committee] material
inside information which, if disclosed, might affect the price of
the stock during the period when the accepted option could be
exercised. 8'
The court's language implies that had the executives made the
required disclosure, they would not have violated Rule 10b-5 because
disinterested option committee approval following full disclosure
would have negated any violation of fiduciary duty and prevented
rescission.
Thus far, this Article has argued only that, assuming full
disclosure to, and approval by, a disinterested board or its committee,
there is no state law fiduciary duty violation on the part of an
executive who receives stock options while in possession of favorable
material nonpublic information about his company. This leaves open
the question whether, without further disclosure to the company's
shareholders, the board of directors violates its fiduciary duty to
shareholders under state law when it grants the stock options. Bear
in mind that, as illustrated above, favorable material nonpublic
information, if publicly released, would raise a company's stock price
and therefore the value of its stock options. 82 Put another way, were
177. Id. at 839-40.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 856-57.
180. The options involved had not been exercised by the executives at the time Texas
Gulf Sulphur was decided. See id. at 857 n.24.
181. Id.
182. See example discussed supra pp. 857-58.
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such information released before the grant date, the options' exercise
price would have been higher and the value of the options
correspondingly lower.
There are numerous reasons to believe a board possessing
knowledge of material favorable undisclosed information might grant
stock options to top managers. As discussed in Part I.A, a board may
be influenced by managers to grant favorably timed options.
Alternatively, a board may intentionally grant executives options at
favorable times, without regard to managerial influence, in the belief
that doing so is an efficient means of compensation. For example,
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code prevents publicly held
corporations from deducting compensation over $1 million paid to its
CEO or its next four highest paid executives unless, among other
requirements, the compensation is "performance-based."183  If a
corporation can substitute the value of opportunistically timed
option-based compensation for cash compensation exceeding $1
million, then it may find it beneficial to compensate the CEO and its
next four highest paid executives in the form of favorably timed
option grants.
A board of directors might also use a favorably timed option
grant as a form of "golden parachute"'1 4 for executives in the event
that the company is sold.185 Executives who might be reluctant to
pursue a sale favored by the board of directors for fear of losing their
management positions following an acquisition are often induced to
support the sale with severance payments, accelerated vesting of
options, or similar devices designed to compensate them upon exit.1 86
Similarly, a grant of options timed to precede any public
183. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2000).
184. "The term 'golden parachute' refers generally to agreements between a
corporation and its top officers which guarantee those officers continued employment,
payment of a lump sum, or other benefits in the event of a change of corporate
ownership." Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1985).
185. One example of such a payment involved options awarded to top managers of
Fore Systems, Inc., a publicly traded Delaware corporation ("Fore"), in the months
leading up to Fore's acquisition by General Electric Company, P.L.C. ("GEC") in 1999.
Millionerrors Inv. Club v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 99-781, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4778, at *3
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000). While Fore's board of directors was actively pursuing a possible
sale of the Company to GEC, as well as to other potential acquirors, Fore's compensation
committee granted a total of 1,300,000 stock options pursuant to the Company's 1998
Stock Option Plan to senior executives at prices ranging from $14.31 to $20.56. Id. at *4.
Less than three weeks after the latest grant of options, GEC's board offered to pay $35
per share in cash for Fore, which Fore's board accepted. Id. As a result, the managers
who had been granted the foregoing options received over $26 million in profits. Id. at *5.
186. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 896-97 (2002).
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announcement that the company is considering being acquired will
make an eventual sale more attractive to managers by providing them
with an incentive to secure the highest possible premium for their
companies' stock.1 87
Whether a board that knows of favorable inside information can
lawfully grant options to managers before that information is released
turns on a director's fiduciary duty of disclosure under applicable
state law. Any state law-based duty of disclosure would be a
judicially imposed fiduciary duty requiring directors to disclose
material information to shareholders under certain circumstances.118
In its earliest form, the law relating to the fiduciary duty of disclosure
arose in the context of transactions between a corporation and
interested officers or directors.'89 The board was deemed disabled
from supplying the objectivity needed to remove the taint of self-
interest from such transactions, and shareholder ratification was
required. 9 ° The fiduciary duty of disclosure required that the board
provide shareholders all information material to a transaction when
seeking their approval of it. 191  Over time, the courts required
directors to inform shareholders fully and fairly of all reasonably
available information material to any issue or transaction for which
shareholder approval was being sought.1" In Malone v. Brincat,193 the
Supreme Court of Delaware addressed the question of whether a
duty of disclosure exists absent any need for shareholder action.
Malone involved allegations that directors made false statements
about corporate earnings, which allegedly caused the company to lose
all of its value. 94 The court stated:
Whenever directors communicate publicly or directly with
shareholders about the corporation's affairs, with or without
a request for shareholder action, directors have a fiduciary
duty to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith and
loyalty. It follows a fortiori that when directors
communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about
187. See id.
188. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The
Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996)
(describing a framework for analyzing a director's fiduciary duty to disclose information to
stockholders).
189. See In re Walt Disney Co., 731 A.2d 342, 369 (Del. Ch. 1998).
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. Brown v. Perette, No. 13531, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 14,
1999).
193. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
194. Id. at 8.
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corporate matters the sine qua non of directors' fiduciary
duty to shareholders is honesty.'95
In other words, "[s]hareholders are entitled to rely upon the
truthfulness of all information disseminated to them by the directors
they elect to manage the corporate enterprise" even in the absence of
a request for shareholder action.196
Malone's requirement that directors make the disclosure
necessary to render their communications to shareholders accurate
thus requires board disclosure of material nonpublic information
known at the time of an option grant, but only upon the board's
communicating to shareholders information relating to the grant. In
other words, if and when a corporation, either voluntarily or pursuant
to applicable disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws,
disseminates information to its shareholders relating to the
compensation of its executive officers in general or option awards in
particular, it must, in order to comply with its state law duty of
disclosure, do so fully and accurately.197
To summarize, under state law fiduciary duty principles, a
manager who receives stock options while in possession of inside
information that will raise the stock price when it is later released
discharges her fiduciary duty of loyalty through full disclosure to and
ratification by a disinterested board. It is then the board's
responsibility, pursuant to its fiduciary duty of disclosure, to inform
the corporation's shareholders of the favorable timing of the grant, if
it disseminates to them information about the company's executive
compensation arrangements. Only a failure on either party's part to
make the required disclosure constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty by
that party under state law.
Assuming that the executive and the board made the required
disclosure, there would be no breach of fiduciary duty under state law
to support liability under Rule 10b-5. Consequently, the question of
195. Id. at 10.
196. Id. at 10-11.
197. The compensation of directors and key officers and transactions between them
and their corporation are matters explicitly covered by securities law disclosure
regulations. See Schedule 14A, Items 8-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2002); Regulation S-
K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402; see also FAS 123, supra note 36 passim (establishing
financial accounting and reporting standards for stock-based employee compensation
plans). These rules are intended, among other things, to provide shareholders with clear
and full disclosure of all material information about an Exchange Act reporting company's
equity compensation practices. See Disclosure of Equity Compensation Plan Information,
Securities Act Release No. 8048, Exchange Act Release No. 45189 [2001-2002 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86, 611, at 85, 110 (Dec. 21,2001).
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deception would never be reached. On the other hand, a failure on
either the executive's or the board's part to make such disclosure
would provide the applicable breach of fiduciary duty. It would then
be necessary to show that the breach was manipulative or deceptive
within the meaning of section 10(b). 198
2. A Uniform Federal Fiduciary Duty
In lieu of looking to state fiduciary duty law as the basis for a
Rule 10b-5 violation, the Supreme Court has suggested its intention
to create a uniform federal fiduciary duty against insider trading on
material nonpublic information.199 That duty is the duty of corporate
insiders to disclose all material nonpublic information known to them
before trading or to abstain from trading.2 °° In the context of open
market transactions, the Court has made clear that the nature of the
information required to be disclosed under the "disclose or abstain"
rule is the substantive information to which the insider is privy due to
his privileged position within the corporation.2 1 With respect to the
question of to whom that information must be disclosed, the Court
has referred to the fiduciary duty against insider trading as a "duty
that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders, '22 and has
suggested that in some circumstances adequate disclosure requires
"more than disclosure to purchasers or sellers '203 and can be effected
only by a public release through the appropriate media, designed to
achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public generally and
without favoring any special person or group. °4
Although the foregoing duty to disclose or abstain can be readily
applied to open market transactions, it is unclear how it should apply
to an intra-corporate transaction, such as an option grant, which does
not involve a direct trade with a shareholder. Under these
circumstances, a standard different from that of disclosing substantive
information to the investing public generally may be appropriate. As
198. For a discussion of the circumstances in which such a breach might fulfill the
deception requirement of Rule 10b-5, see infra text accompanying notes 205-12.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
200. In WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 156, Professors Wang and Steinberg
characterize an insider's fiduciary duties in terms of a "classical special relationship
triangle" among the issuer, the insider trader, and the counterparty to the trade. Id. at
§ 5.2.1. The insider's counterparty to an option grant is the issuer. The question central to
this Article is the method by which an insider discharges his fiduciary duties to the issuer
and its shareholders when transacting with the issuer, i.e., his own corporation.
201. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
202. Id. at 653 n.10.
203. Id. at 653 n.12.
204. Id. (quoting In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973)).
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in the state law analysis, it is again relevant to distinguish between the
obligations of the executive receiving the option and the board.
We begin again with an executive who has favorable material
inside information about his company upon receiving an option grant.
One possibility for the federal disclosure standard applicable to the
executive is the one provided by state law. In other words, the
executive must disclose the information to a disinterested board
before accepting the grant. Without such minimal disclosure, the
executive possessing significant favorable inside information about
his company who accepts a large option grant from a board that is not
privy to such information will enjoy a profit attributable solely to the
eventual release of the inside information. In the absence of any
reason to believe otherwise, both the board and shareholders will
assume that this profit is attributable to the executive's efforts or his
good fortune. In either case, they will not seek any countervailing
adjustment in his compensation, such as a reduction in the number of
options granted, salary, or bonus.
If the account in Part L.A that managers are able to influence the
timing of their option grants is correct, then shareholders, protected
by Rule 10b-5 when initially purchasing their shares on the open
market, would, upon becoming shareholders, be at the mercy of
managers' ability to divert firm profits to themselves in the form of
favorably timed option grants. Information about such behavior is
relevant to shareholders' investment decisions because it affects both
the level and composition of managerial pay.2"5 Yet, it would never
be made available to shareholders.
Requiring executives to disclose inside information to the board
when the information is not already in the board's possession, as
required under state fiduciary duty principles, achieves some of the
policy objectives of section 10(b). It should, for example, give the
board the ability to adjust executive compensation in light of the
inside information. Such disclosure is unlikely, however, to address
adequately section 10(b)'s purposes of protecting investors and
promoting market confidence. First, it is well settled that a
corporation "in possession of material nonpublic information, must,
like other insiders in the same situation, disclose that information to
its shareholders or refrain from trading with them. 20 6  Thus, a
corporation cannot trade its own stock based on material nonpublic
205. See John C. Coffee, Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, N.Y. L.J., July 31, 1997,
at 5,6.
206. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994).
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information. 2°7  Allowing a company to time option grants around
inside information can be analogized to allowing a company to
engage in insider trading in the open market and then use the profits
to pay its executives.2 8
Board knowledge alone might also be insufficient to discharge
the disclosure duty of section 10(b) because, even if the board were to
treat favorable grant timing as executive compensation, periodic
disclosure regarding such compensation occurs with a substantial
delay.20 9 Moreover, in certain cases, it does not occur at all. For
example, a company that makes an option grant to executives shortly
before being acquired and whose stock ceases to be publicly traded
before the filing of its next annual report will generally not be
required to disclose compensation information for that year.210
Without timely disclosure of favorable option grant timing,
investors cannot properly assess the effect of a company's option
awards on firm performance. Nor can shareholders exercise any
injunctive remedies with respect to such awards available to them
under state law. 21' To the contrary, rhetoric claiming that options
207. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 156, § 5.2.3.3, at 297-98.
208. Of course, the counterparties to the corporation's trading and consequently the
parties suffering the loss from it would be different in each case.
209. Disclosure regarding executive compensation is required to be included in the
annual report on Form 10-K of an Exchange Act reporting company. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000) (requiring annual reports); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.13a-1 to -.13f-1 (2002) (providing rules on periodic disclosure requirements of
Exchange Act registered companies); Form 10-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,105
(June 25, 2003) (Item 11) (requiring executive compensation information at Item 11);
Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2002). Although corporate insiders are
required to report to the SEC an issuer's grant to them of stock options on Form 4
pursuant to section 16(a) of the Exchange Act no later than the end of the second business
day following the date of the grant, Form 4 does not call for disclosure of any
compensatory element associated with the grant. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), as amended by
§ 403(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 403, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(a), 116
Stat. 789 (July 30,2002); Form 4, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 33,721 (May 21,2003).
210. If, however, the transaction requires shareholder approval and stock options were
granted in connection with the transaction, information relating to the options would need
to be disclosed in the proxy statement in which shareholder approval is being sought.
Regulation S-K, Item 404, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404.
211. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-21 (2d Cir. 1977) (nondisclosure to
shareholders as to material facts of transaction held actionable under Rule 10b-5 even
though no shareholder action was required with respect to the transaction based on
shareholders' potential ability to enjoin transaction). But see Isquith v. Caremark Int'l,
Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that this circuit has rejected Goldberg). For
an early discussion of basing a Rule 10b-5 action on nondisclosure to shareholders, see
generally Ely J. Malkin, Comment, Santa Fe Industries v. Green Revisited: A Critique of
Circuit Court Application of Rule lOb-5 to Breaches of Fiduciary Duty to Minority
Shareholders, 28 UCLA L. REV. 564 (1981).
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align managerial and shareholder interests generally accompanies
proxy statement proposals seeking shareholder approval of executive
stock option plans. For example, the purposes of these plans are
often stated as being "to increase incentives," "encourage share
ownership," and "stimulate the efforts" of key executive officers.212
The underlying message of these statements is, of course, to persuade
shareholders that performance-based compensation encourages
executives to promote the shareholders' long-term interests.
If the award of substantial options to executives is, indeed,
perceived to incorporate valuable information about incentivizing
executives, then the possibility that such awards were systematically
timed to precede the release of material information known by
insiders on the grant date would presumably lead investors to
question the effectiveness of the option grants in promoting long-
term company performance. The reason for this is that it would be
virtually impossible under these circumstances to predict the
incentive effects of the adoption of an option plan or of individual
grants. In other words, investors would be unable to distinguish
between the (backward-looking) compensation and (forward-
looking) incentive aspects of the options until subsequent disclosure,
if any, were made about the inside information in an executive's
possession at the time of the grant.
Even after any such delayed disclosure were made, investors
would, knowing that boards were timing options to benefit managers
without regard to the company's future performance, be unable to
rely on option awards to reduce agency costs. Loss of this vehicle for
aligning managerial and shareholder interests might seriously erode
the belief of investors that managers have financial incentives to
maximize long-term company performance, thereby damaging their
confidence in the market. It may, therefore, be appropriate to
require disclosure by executive optionees who are granted options
while in possession of inside information similar to that required of
insiders in their open market dealings-namely, substantive
disclosure of the inside information to shareholders before the grant
is made or abstention from accepting the grant.
It might be argued that, under the misappropriation theory of
insider trading liability, board knowledge prevents the deception
requirement of Rule 10b-5 from being satisfied. The
212. See, e.g., GENENTECH, INC., PROXY STATEMENT 11 (2002) (describing rationale
for option plan) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); INTEL CORP., PROXY
STATEMENT 20 (1989) (same) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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misappropriation theory, articulated in the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. O'Hagan, provides that a party who trades on
material nonpublic information without disclosure to the source of
that information violates Rule 10b-5.21 3  Under that view, the
company's knowledge of the information precludes deception. 14
Applicability of the misappropriation theory to classical insider
trading cases is, however, problematic. In O'Hagan, the Supreme
Court validated the misappropriation theory as a basis for insider
trading liability.215 The misappropriation theory holds that a person
violates Rule 10b-5 when, in breach of a duty she owes to the source
of certain information, she uses that information in connection with a
securities transaction.216 The misappropriation theory was upheld by
the Court in the context of the following facts. The law firm of
Dorsey & Whitney represented Grand Metropolitan PLC ("Grand
Met") in connection with its possible tender offer for the common
stock of the Pillsbury Company.217 Although O'Hagan, a partner in
the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, did no work on the matter, he
learned of Grand Met's intentions and accumulated call options and
shares of Pillsbury stock.218 When Grand Met eventually announced
its tender offer, Pillsbury stock rose and O'Hagan pocketed a
substantial profit.219
The classical theory of insider trading liability could not support
an action against O'Hagan. O'Hagan was a partner in Dorsey &
Whitney. He had no fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of
Pillsbury. As in Dirks, O'Hagan "himself was a stranger to
[Pillsbury], with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. '"220
Accordingly, he had no specific relationship that could give rise to a
213. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,652 (1997).
214. Id. at 655.
215. Id. at 653. The misappropriation theory has been alternately praised and
criticized. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589
(1999) (stating that the court had made a "hash" of the law when it upheld the
misappropriation theory); Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading
After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 (1998) (questioning whether the
misappropriation theory will be a workable instrument for enforcing insider trading); A.C.
Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy for the
Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 17 (1998) (stating that the misappropriation
theory "secures the law of insider trading to firmer foundations"). Irrespective of its
merits, however, O'Hagan has made the misappropriation theory settled law.
216. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
217. Id. at 647.
218. Id. at 647-48.
219. Id. at 648.
220. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983).
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duty to disclose or abstain. O'Hagan's trading could not breach a
fiduciary duty where none existed.
The government had therefore not relied on the classical theory
of insider trading liability in prosecuting O'Hagan, instead trying the
case under the misappropriation theory. O'Hagan was convicted in
district court for violation of Rule 10b-5, but the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected use of the misappropriation theory as a basis for
insider trading liability and reversed his conviction.2 ' Because a
conflict in the circuits existed with respect to the viability of the
misappropriation theory, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, thereby establishing
the misappropriation theory as a distinct theory of liability under
Rule 10b-5. 223  According to the Supreme Court, O'Hagan's
deception involved "feigning fidelity to the source of information.
2 4
Thus, had O'Hagan obtained his law firm's consent to trade on the
nonpublic information that he acquired by virtue of his position, or
had he merely disclosed to his law firm that he planned to trade on it,
there would have been no deception and thus no section 10(b)
violation.225
Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued that, with minor
modifications, O'Hagan's discussion of deception could logically be
extended beyond misappropriation cases to cases of classical insider
trading.226  Noting that under the classical theory, an insider's
fiduciary duty runs to the company's shareholders, Prakash posits that
an insider's disclosure merely of an intent to trade using material
nonpublic information (as opposed to the substantive information
itself) eliminates any possible deception of shareholders should the
insider subsequently execute her trading plans.227  Alternatively,
Prakash suggests that a company's authorization of insider trading by
its executives precludes deception.228
Although applying O'Hagan's treatment of deception to the
221. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642
(1997).
222. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649.
223. See id. at 650 (holding that liability under section 10(b) may be predicated on the
misappropriation theory).
224. Id. at 655.
225. Id. at 660.
226. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 156, § 5.4.3; Coffee, supra note 205, at 5;
Painter et al., supra note 215, at 180 n.116; Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider
Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1516 (1999).
227. Prakash, supra note 226, at 1515.
228. Id.
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classical theory is intriguing, there are good reasons to confine it to
trading by "outsiders" (i.e., traders, such as O'Hagan, who owe a
fiduciary duty not to the shareholders of the companies in whose
stock they trade but, rather, to the source of the information). First,
there is the express language of O'Hagan: "[t]he misappropriation
theory is ... designed to 'protec[t] the integrity of the securities
markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corporation who have
access to confidential information that will affect th[e] corporation's
security price when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty
to that corporation's shareholders.' "229 Like the classical theory, the
misappropriation theory requires a relationship of trust or
confidence.20 In the misappropriation theory context, however, the
operative relationship is not that between "the shareholders of a
corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential
information by reason of their position with that corporation. '231
Instead, it is the relationship between a corporate "outsider"-one
with no relationship to the shareholders of the corporation in whose
securities he trades-and the source of the information.
Second, extending O'Hagan to classical insider trading cases
presents the possibility that a corporate board could decide that
inside information is a corporate perquisite that managers should be
authorized to use to gain a strategic advantage in trading the
company's shares. In other words, boards could adopt a corporate
policy allowing insider trading by managers. While some scholars
have argued that such private contracting is efficient,232 its application
in the classical disclose or abstain arena undermines the interests of
investors that section 10(b) was designed to protect.233
Under the classical theory, the operative fiduciary relationship is
between the insider and the party on the other side of the transaction.
To the extent shareholders are intended to be protected from
insiders' use of their privileged positions to gain an unfair trading
advantage, disclosure of no more than an insider's trading plans
229. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14, United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 86-242)).
230. Rule 10b5(2) provides a non-exclusive list of circumstances in which a person has
a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the misappropriation theory. See SEC Rule
10b-5(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(2) (2002).
231. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,228 (1980).
232. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the
Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV 9, 39-47 (1984) (arguing that a
"subject of contract" test should replace the "pecuniary gain" test).
233. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 156, § 5.4.1, at 386 & n. 49y (Supp. 2002);
Coffee, supra note 205, at 5.
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would be incomplete. Shareholders would still confront transactions
in which their trading disadvantage could not be overcome with
research or skill."' Nor would such limited disclosure promote
confidence in the securities markets. On the contrary, it would be
more likely to undermine it by reducing whatever expectations
investors had of earning market returns.2 35
In misappropriation cases, however, the interest to be protected
is the source's exclusive right to the applicable information. In such a
context, board authorization of trading on nonpublic information is
well suited to protecting the interests of the source of the information.
The information on which the agent wishes to trade is already in the
possession of, indeed belongs to, the source of the information.
Eliminating any deception of the source under the misappropriation
theory thus requires awareness of the fiduciary's intent to use the
nonpublic information for personal gain, thereby precluding any
feigning of fidelity to the source of the information.2 36
Having concluded that neither knowledge of, nor authorization
by, the board negates deception in classical insider trading cases, we
are left with the question whether the same can be said in the setting
of favorably timed option grants. Dirks suggested that it can when it
equated a breach of an insider's federal common law fiduciary duty
with deception:
Not "all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a
securities transaction," however, come within the ambit of Rule
10b-5. There must also be "manipulation or deception." In an
inside-trading case this fraud derives from the "inherent
unfairness involved where one takes advantage" of
"information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." Thus, an
insider will be liable under Rule 10b-5 for inside trading only
where he fails to disclose material nonpublic information before
trading on it and thus makes "secret profits. '237
In other words, an insider's breach of federal fiduciary duty law
is deemed inherently deceptive. Thus, an executive who knowingly
receives a favorably timed option grant faces potential liability under
Rule 10b-5 whenever he fails to satisfy his federal common law
obligation to disclose or abstain. As discussed above, that obligation
234. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658-59; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 79, at 548.
235. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 79, at 548-50.
236. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655.
237. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (citations omitted).
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requires, at a minimum, that he disclose his knowledge to the board
and, possibly, that he disclose it publicly or reject the options.
Because an executive's fiduciary duty of disclosure under federal
law may, in the context of an option grant, be limited to disclosure to
the board, a knowledgeable board's duty of disclosure to
shareholders, if any, must still be addressed. The purposes underlying
section 10(b) require a knowledgeable board to avoid making
materially misleading statements in connection with a securities
transaction.238 Because shareholders have an interest in knowing both
the level and structure of executive pay, information regarding all
forms of executive compensation, including that associated with
favorably timed option grants, is potentially significant to them. The
details of executive compensation arrangements affect not only their
investment decisions but also their decisions whether and how to
influence executive pay. Although, as noted above, disclosure of
favorably timed option grants as a component of executive pay could
be accomplished as part of a company's periodic compensation
disclosure, the delays associated with such disclosure limit its
effectiveness. Nevertheless, such disclosure may be sufficient to bar a
Rule lOb-5 claim in the absence of clear evidence that shareholders
are harmed by failure to disclose either: (1) the substantive material
nonpublic information in their possession before the grant is made; or
(2) the compensatory component of a favorably timed grant when the
grant is made.
The foregoing conclusions are consistent with the sentiment
underlying the 1934 Act that those "charged with the administration
of other people's money must not use inside information for their
own advantage. '"23 9  Requiring, at a minimum, full disclosure of
executive compensation attributable to favorably timed option grants
to be included in a company's periodic compensation disclosure
would provide shareholders with more accurate information relating
to the level and nature of top managers' pay. A rule of disclosure or
abstention from accepting the grant would go even further in
eliminating insiders' ability to profit on nonpublic information. In
either case, the disclosure would generally eliminate the use of option
grant timing as a means of awarding executives secret compensation
and further the 1934 Act's significant purpose of "eliminat[ing] the
idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a
238. See Thel, supra note 114, at 415 (describing the fundamental purpose of the
Securities Act as that of full disclosure).
239. HR. REP. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
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normal emolument of corporate office. 241
B. Purchase or Sale
Rule 10b-5, by its terms, operates only in connection with the
"purchase or sale" of a security. 241 The Supreme Court has held that
the holders of exchange-traded puts, calls, options, and other
contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities are
"purchasers" or "sellers" under Rule 10b-5.242 Satisfaction under
existing case law of the purchase or sale requirement is not so clear,
however, in the context of a company that grants options to its
employees.243
In addition, in statutory construction cases, the plain language of
the statute is of paramount importance.244 Section 3(a)(14) defines
the term "sale" for purposes of the Exchange Act "unless the context
otherwise requires" to "include any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of. 2 45 There is a parallel definition of the term "purchase. 2 46
Although the various meanings of the words "purchase" and "sale"
throughout the securities laws is a relevant factor in interpreting their
meaning in Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has stated that the scope
of the words "purchase or sale" in section 10(b) must be determined
in the context of that section, regardless of what they or similar words
240. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 n.10 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
n.15 (1981)).
241. The United States Justice Department and the SEC have standing under Rule
10b-5 to sue any person who commits fraud in connection with a purchase or sale of a
security. In order to bring a private party action under Rule 10b-5, however, the plaintiff
must allege that she was an actual purchaser or seller of securities. See Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
242. See Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 593-94
(2001); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 751.
243. Yablon & Hill, supra note 85, at 98 n.59.
244. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).
245. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (2000).
246. Id. § 78c(a)(13). The Supreme Court has noted that the definition of "sale" in
section 2(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3), differs from that in the
Exchange Act in that it requires that the contract of sale or disposition of a security be
"for value," but has not reached the issue whether the word has different meanings under
each. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 556-57 n.8 (1979). Nevertheless, courts have generally incorporated the "for
value" requirement of the Securities Act definition into the Exchange Act definition. See
Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968). But see Rathborne v. Rathborne, 683
F.2d 914, 919-20 & nn.17-20 (5th Cir. 1982) (focusing not on the "for value" requirement
but rather on whether the transaction created fundamental change in the nature of the
investment). For purposes of this Article, I assume that a contract to buy or sell securities
constitutes a "sale" or "purchase" under the Exchange Act only if the seller receives value
for it.
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may mean in other provisions of the securities laws.247
Thus, in interpreting the "purchase or sale" language of section
10(b), the courts have looked beyond the traditional meanings of
those words.248 In particular, guidance in determining the reach of the
words "purchase or sale" under Rule 10b-5 is to be found by looking
to whether the conduct in question is the type of behavior that section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were intended to prohibit.249 Also informing
the proper interpretation of the language of section 10(b) is the
Supreme Court's instruction in Superintendent of Insurance of New
York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.25° that section 10(b) must be
read "flexibly, not technically and restrictively."25' This is necessary,
as the Court cautioned in that case, because practices " 'legitimate for
some purposes may be turned to illegitimate and fraudulent
means.' "252 Therefore, the effectiveness of the securities laws
requires that the SEC be given broad discretionary power in their
application.
The strongest precedent for the proposition that a stock option
award satisfies the "purchase or sale" requirement of Rule lOb-5 is
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 253 Recall that Texas Gulf Sulphur
held that executives who received stock options while in possession of
the nonpublic material information that their company had
discovered an extraordinarily valuable mineral deposit on land owned
by it violated Rule 10b-5 by accepting the options without disclosing
the information. The issuance of the options was made pursuant to
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company's Stock Option Incentive Plan, which
was adopted to provide incentives to officers and highly paid
employees. 4 Although the court did not elaborate on the point, it
must have assumed that the optionees were purchasers under Rule
10b-5 because without the benefit of that assumption, there could
have been no fraud "in connection with a purchase or sale," as
required by the Rule.
247. SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,466 (1969).
248. See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1967) (stating
that Congress did not intend "purchase" and "sale" to have limited commercial
meanings); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 n.9 (5th Cir. 1960)
(noting that "sale" and "purchase" are both broad).
249. Nat'l Sec., 393 U.S. at 467.
250. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
251. Id. at 12.
252. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 7 (1934)).
253. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
254. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Notwithstanding Texas Gulf Sulphur, courts have been reluctant
to accept the proposition that a stock option grant satisfies the
"purchase or sale" requirement of Rule 10b-5.2 51 The vast majority of
cases addressing the question arise in the context of employees who
receive stock option awards that ultimately prove worthless.256
Typically arguing that they were deceived into believing that the
options awarded to them had substantial value, these employees
claim that they were "purchasers" of the options and therefore
entitled to bring a private party action under Rule 10b-5.257
A recent example is In re Cendant Corporation Securities
Litigation.258  The case involved a former employee of Cendant
Corporation and its predecessor CUC International, Inc. ("CUC")
who received employee stock options under an employee stock
option plan.259  After the options had been granted, Cendant
announced that it had discovered accounting irregularities in certain
former CUC business units, and its stock promptly fell by forty-seven
percent.260 In rejecting the employee's claim that she was a
"purchaser" of options within the meaning of Rule 10b-5, the court
was persuaded that the employee's receipt of her options by virtue
solely of the fact that she qualified for participation under the plan
did not "suffice to constitute the type of investment which the
Securities Acts were intended to regulate. '261 In concluding that the
employee had not made an affirmative investment decision to acquire
her options, the court noted that: (1) participation in the plan was
compulsory, so that it was a mere incident of employment and her
only choice would have been to forego the receipt of the benefit; and
(2) the plan was noncontributory, so that she did not receive her
255. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566-69 (1979); In re Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation, 76 F. Supp.
2d, 539, 544-45 (D.N.J. 1999).
256. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. CIV.A.H-01-
3913, 2003 WL 22245394, at *88 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2003) (where participants in employee
stock option plans brought a class action lawsuit after Enron went bankrupt and the
options became worthless, the court suggested that "a compulsory, noncontributory
program ... would not be subject to the Securities Act"); In re Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp.
2d at 541, 545 (indicating that where a former employee brought suit when stock options
became worthless after accounting irregularities were discovered, the plaintiff had no
standing under Rule 10b-5 because the employee stock option plan was compulsory and
noncontributory).
257. See In re Enron, 2003 WL 2255392, at *88; In re Cendant, 76 F.Supp.2d at 545.
258. 76 F. Supp. 2d 539 (D.N.J. 1999).
259. Id. at 541.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 544-45 (quoting Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1064 (N.D. W. Va.
1983)).
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options as part of a bargained-for exchange.262
In contrast, the court in Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition
Institute, Inc.,263 stated that a Rule 10b-5 action is available to an
individual who promises to work for an employer in return for the
latter's promise to issue stock, with or without the payment of a
salary.2 4  In Yoder, the court believed that the plaintiff gave up
specific consideration-namely her way of life-in exchange for a
contract for the issuance of stock.265 Having given value for the
contract, the plaintiff qualified as an investor to whom section 10(b)
was intended to apply.266
In the foregoing cases, the courts distinguished between a
bargained-for exchange, in which the employee has negotiated with
his employer to exchange his labor for a compensation package that
include stock options, on the one hand, and an employee's receipt of
stock options "as a bonus, granted gratuitously by an employer," on
the other hand.267 Under the former circumstances, which generally
involve senior level employees, the courts have concluded that the
employees were investors who made an affirmative investment
decision to exchange their labor for stock options. Under the latter
circumstances, which generally involve the receipt of stock options by
rank-and-file employees, the courts have deemed the employees to
have received their stock options incidentally to their employment.
In other words, the courts have taken the view that the stock option
component of these employees' compensation packages was largely
irrelevant to their employment decision. As such, the courts have
held that these employees are not investors entitled to the protection
of section 10(b).268
262. Id.; see also Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1158
(D.D.C. 1986) (noting the "element of voluntariness"). But see Falkowski v. Imation
Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an option grant is "a sale under the
securities laws because it is a contract to sell a security when the option is exercised" and
expressly rejecting the contrary holding of In re Cendant Corp.).
263. 751 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1985).
264. Id. at 561 (noting that, although it did not hold so, it saw "little reason for not
holding to that effect"); see also Rudinger v. Ins. Data Processing, Inc. 778 F. Supp. 1334,
1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("An agreement exchanging a plaintiffs services for a
corporation's stock constitutes a 'sale' under the terms of 10b-5."); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F.
Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972) (distinguishing between a bonus granted gratuitously by an
employer which would not support sale treatment and an option that was a quid pro quo
offered to induce plaintiff to enter into employment which would).
265. Yoder, 751 F.2d at 560.
266. Id. at 559-61.
267. Collins, 342 F. Supp. at 1289.
268. The express language of section 10(b) provides a basis for this inquiry in giving the
SEC rulemaking authority "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
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Texas Gulf Sulphur can be read consistently with the foregoing
cases, whatever the merits of the distinction those cases make
between employees who individually bargain for stock options and
those who receive them as an automatic benefit.269  As discussed
above,27° Texas Gulf Sulphur dealt with insiders accepting a grant of
stock options while in possession of favorable material nonpublic
information. Although the court did not offer an analysis of its
holding, it noted that the executives were all members of "top
management. ' 271 Because these executives likely negotiated for
participation in TGS's option plan as an element of their
compensation packages, the Court could easily have concluded that
the executives had bargained for the right to receive options. Once a
bargained-for-exchange is shown, the case falls within the Yoder line
of cases, in which the optionee is an investor who qualifies as a
purchase under Rule 10b-5.
Perhaps more important than the fact that the outcome in Texas
Gulf Sulphur can be analyzed in terms of the bargained-for-exchange
theory of the Yoder line of cases, however, is the observation that
most of the cases dealing with whether employee stock option grants
are "purchases or sales" focus on the particular set of circumstances
in which a recipient of stock options appeals to Rule 10b-5 in
connection with a diminution in value of those securities. That
context, in which an optionee seeks relief based on his corporation's
fraudulent conduct in granting him options, raises different policy
concerns than the context in which existing shareholders are harmed
by a grant of options to managers with an exercise price that
understates the actual market value of the underlying stock. These
differing concerns must be considered because whether a transaction
qualifies as a purchase or sale under Rule 10b-5 depends critically on
whether the conduct in issue "is the type of fraudulent behavior
which was meant to be forbidden by the statute and the rule. 272
When grants are fraudulently timed for the secret enrichment of
managers, the resulting harm implicates the investor protection
protection of investors." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000)
(emphasis added); see Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b):
Security Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 359, 377 ("Section 10(b) itself states its end-the SEC is to protect investors and the
public.").
269. For a critique of this distinction, see generally Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning
Incentives: Employee Stock Options and Rule lOb-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2003).
270. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
271. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 857 (2d Cir. 1968).
272. SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453,467 (1969).
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concerns of section 10(b). As discussed in Part II.B, stock options
awards to insiders with an exercise price that does not fully reflect
favorable material nonpublic information imposes direct costs on
shareholders." 3  The resulting wealth transfer from investors to
insiders is the same type of harm as that suffered by investors who sell
their shares to an insider where the insider possesses favorable
nonpublic information about the issuer of which the investor is
ignorant. In both cases, information has been concealed from the
shareholder that, if disclosed, would have affected the value of the
applicable securities and eliminated the resulting windfall to the
insider.
C. In Connection with
To constitute a section 10(b) violation, it is not enough that a
fraud have been perpetrated; the fraud must be "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." '2 74 This requirement ensures
that there be a meaningful nexus between the fraud perpetrated and a
securities transaction, in keeping with the Exchange Act's aim of
preserving the integrity of the securities markets. As the Supreme
Court stated in SEC v. Zandford,275 its most recent pronouncement
on the "in connection with" requirement, Congress intended section
10(b) neither to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud nor "to
convert every common-law fraud that happens to involve securities
into a violation of section 10(b)." '276
According to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "in
connection with" requirement, the securities transaction and the
fraudulent practices alleged cannot be independent events for a
section 10(b) violation to exist. For example, a section 10(b) violation
would not exist where a securities broker lawfully consummated a
transaction on behalf of a customer and later stole the proceeds.277
Similarly, the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Hagan27 suggested
that there would be no section 10(b) violation where a person
defrauded a bank into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from
another, and then used the proceeds to invest in securities. 279 In the
foregoing cases, the fraud perpetrated is sufficiently detached from
273. See supra Part ll.B.
274. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
275. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
276. Id. at 820.
277. See id.
278. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
279. Id. at 656 (quoting with approval the Government's Brief on this point).
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the subsequent securities transaction that the "in connection
requirement" is not met.28°
In Zandford, the Court considered a case in which a father and
daughter gave a securities broker discretion to manage an investment
account for "safety of principal and income. '28 1 Instead of pursuing
that objective, the broker sold securities in the account and then
made personal use of the proceeds.282 Some of the transfers involved
the broker's writing checks against a mutual fund in the customers'
names, which required liquidating securities in order to redeem the
checks.283 The Court first noted, as it had in previous cases, that
section 10(b) is to be construed flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes. 284 It then observed that the SEC had consistently adopted a
broad reading of the "in connection with" requirement and gave the
SEC's interpretation deference.285
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court concluded that the
broker's securities sales were sufficiently related to his fraudulent
scheme to convert the proceeds of the sales to his own use to satisfy
the "in connection with" requirement.286 The Court found it relevant
that each securities sale of the broker was made for his own benefit,
so that the broker's fraud coincided with the securities sales. As such,
the two were not independent because the broker initiated the
securities sales in furtherance of his fraudulent purpose. This
practice, the Court noted, was especially threatening to investor
confidence, which the Exchange Act was intended to promote,
because it prevents investors from trusting that their brokers are
executing transactions for their benefit and compromises the use of
discretionary accounts.
Assume that the grant of an executive stock option qualifies as a
"purchase or sale" under section 10(b). If favorable inside
information were known to executives when they were granted a
stock option award, then the grant and the executive's knowledge of
the inside information must not be independent to meet the "in
connection with" requirement. In these circumstances, shareholders
are given the false impression that the options are being granted at
280. Id. at 656-57.
281. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822.
282. Id. at 820.
283. Id. at 821.
284. Id. at 819 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963)).
285. Id. at 819-20.
286. Id. at 825.
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their fair market value, when in fact they bear an exercise price that
does not fully incorporate inside information known to the
executives. Put another way, the options are discount options
masquerading as at-the-money options. As in Zandford, the fraud
coincides with the securities sales. The two events are not
independent. In fact, the timing of the option grant is determined to
maximize the windfall to the optionee, just as the broker's desire for
funds in Zandford determined the timing of his securities sales. 87
CONCLUSION
For better or worse, stock options are the principal way that
companies in the United States try to motivate managers to act in the
best interests of their shareholders. The prevalence of stock options
as a component of executive pay creates the possibility for managers
to behave opportunistically with respect to the timing of option
grants, when an option's exercise price is typically established at the
then-current market price of the underlying stock. Specifically,
managers can enhance the value of their options by timing the
options' award dates to precede the release of favorable corporate
information that was known only to insiders at the time of the grant.
In fact, several studies have suggested that such opportunistic timing
of stock option awards occurs.
On its face, using material nonpublic information as a means of
compensating executives would seem to violate the federal insider
trading prohibition of Rule 10b-5. After all, the Supreme Court in
Dirks referred specifically to the use of inside information by
corporate insiders to make "secret profits" as a wrong that Rule 10b-5
was intended to prevent. An inquiry into modern insider trading
jurisprudence, however, highlights difficulties in applying current
doctrine to intra-corporate transactions such as stock option grants.
In particular, the source of the fiduciary duty-state or federal-that
must be breached as a prerequisite to a federal insider trading
violation is not certain. Moreover, the additional requirement that
287. The fact that the option grant might also involve a legitimate purpose-namely, to
motivate the executive-should not remove the transaction from the reach of section
10(b). It was the broker's mandate in Zandford to trade securities in his customers'
account. Indeed, the broker may well have timed his trades consistently with the stated
objectives for the account. What the Court found dispositive in Zandford was that the
broker's sales were made to further his fraudulent scheme. Id. at 820; see also The Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 597 (2001) (holding that
seller's fraud was "in connection with" sale of an option where seller sold option while
secretly intending not to permit its exercise).
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the breach of fiduciary duty cause some deception of investors does
not contain much guidance on who must be deceived or how.
This Article has tried to show that an executive who uses inside
information to time option awards for personal gain without, at a
minimum, disclosing such information to the board of directors,
violates Rule 10b-5. This is true irrespective of whether state or
federal law is used to determine the fiduciary duties of managers.
The Article further contends that if the board has inside information
at the time that it grants an option, it must at least disclose the
compensatory element of the grant in its regular executive
compensation disclosure. Moreover, if it is federal rather than state
law that supplies the substance of the fiduciary duty requirement,
then the executive or the board must go further and fully disclose the
inside information before the grant is made or avoid the grant. This
Article has also analyzed the requirement of an insider trading
violation that any fraud be "in connection with the purchase or sale"
of a security and concluded that this requirement does not pose a
problem for applying Rule 10b-5 to option grants.
Application of Rule 10b-5 to stock option awards need not
unduly restrict companies from awarding stock options. For example,
stock options granted on a periodic basis should cleanse the grants.
Corporate officials could also wait until after the dissemination of
earnings or other important information before making option grants.
Another appropriate method of granting options while material
inside information is pending disclosure is to postpone the
establishment of the options' exercise price for a six-month period, by
which time material inside information pending at the time of the
grant can be assumed to have become public. These sorts of
compliance programs are routinely implemented to protect against
traditional insider trading violations and could easily be applied to
stock option awards.
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